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An Incurable Malaise: Commonwealth v. Australian 
Capital Territory and Baskin v. Bogan as Symptoms of 
Early-Onset Dystopia 
Neville Rochow SC∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dystopia holds sway in all of our imaginations. That concept of 
control by others and loss of individual freedom is the stuff of our 
collective nightmare. The very idea that the only freedom is one of 
conforming to an order that is dictated sends chills down the spine. 
One thing that is noticeably absent in the books and films of the 
popular dystopia is any mention of deity or religion. The implied 
premise seems to be that all such questions were disposed of long 
before the events of the current story. But nowhere do we get the 
backstory as to how such questions disappeared. 
We are left to guess how, in this or that particular dystopia, 
consideration of the divine disappeared. Recognizing, as one must, 
that correlation is not causation, we are left to speculate whether the 
loss of religious inclination was merely coincidental or whether that 
loss may have had some contributing effect to the sorry state of 
affairs in which the story places us. 
We may not be in need of speculation much longer. It has long 
been a part of the arsenal of arguments used against proposed 
changes to marriage laws that these laws would be used as a 
weapon—in combination with anti-discrimination laws—to drive 
more conservative, predominantly religious views of marriage from 
 
∗ Barrister; adjunct Professor at Notre Dame University, Sydney, and adjunct Associate 
Professor at University of Adelaide Law School; member of the Adelaide Law School Research 
Unit for the Study of Society, Law and Religion. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the author alone and are not necessarily those of any organization. Earlier versions of this 
article were presented on Aug. 26, 2014 at the Marriage Day Conference, Parliament House, 
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia and on Oct. 6, 2014 at the 21st Annual 
International Law and Religion Symposium, “Varieties of Secularism, Religion and the Law,” 
Provo UT. They also reflect the law as it stood as at January 2015. The decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) and other recent 
developments are considered in the Postscript to this Article. 
ROCHOW.FINROCHOW.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2016  4:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
610 
the public square. With the changes that are occurring, those 
arguments—placed as logical extrapolations—now have evidence that 
the laws promoting tolerance of deviations from a previously 
accepted norm seem only to promote tolerance of the deviation in 
substitution of the norm. This limits the freedom of those who hold 
conservative views from promoting or even preferring the norm. 
In the case of marriage reform, which is so closely connected to 
moral and religious beliefs, our only freedom left might be 
conformity. If so, could we perhaps be witnessing symptoms of early-
onset dystopia? 
This Article looks at how various courts have recently dealt with 
questions of proposed marriage reform and finds that they have 
limited the ability of gay marriage opponents to disagree. This 
limitation puts freedom of conscience and religious liberty at serious 
risk.1 The approach of these courts also suggests that societies can 
introduce a new right without carefully considering the cost that it 
may have for time-honored liberties that have served society well in 
the past. This Article argues that instead of requiring an urgent 
rewriting of all that is now held dear to many individuals, societies 
should take a gradualist approach, weighing each matter carefully 
before jettisoning the old mores.2 
To accomplish all of this, this Article analyzes two cases, one 
from Australia and one from the United States: Australian Capital 
Territory and Baskin. Part II introduces these two cases and some of 
the problems with their reasoning. Parts III and IV then delve into 
each of the cases individually, pointing out—particularly in Baskin—
the arguments and factual matters that appear to be the subjects of 
confusion, elision, conflation, and oversight. Part V then addresses 
evidence of the negative impact same-sex marriage would have on 
 
 1.  One scholar has argued that the protections for religious freedom in Australia were 
already relatively weak. See generally, Denise Meyerson, The Protection of Religious Rights 
under Australian Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 529. As to the potential for greater protection, see 
Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà vu: An Australian Bill of Rights, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 821, 836–42; Protecting Religious Freedom under Bills of Rights: Australia as Microcosm, 
in FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (Paul Babie & Neville Rochow 
eds., 2012). 
 2.  Other issues, beyond the scope of this inquiry, include whether our anti-
discrimination laws require recalibration. See Neil J. Foster & Katherine Towers, New Anti-
discrimination Laws “Erode Religious Freedom”, THE AUSTRALIAN, May 9, 2014, at 35–6, 
available at http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/81. 
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society generally and children especially. Part VI shows the history 
and tactics of the LGBT community in achieving its goal of same-sex 
marriage, including the negative impact it is having on the freedoms 
of speech, association, religion, and conscience. Part VII concludes 
questioning whether the law is developing in a way that benefits 
society as a whole. 
II. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY & BASKIN: 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS 
A. Australian Capital Territory Introduction 
In a previous article, I explained how, under Australian 
constitutional arrangements, it was arguable whether the federal or 
the state legislatures are competent to pass laws permitting so-called 
“same-sex” marriage.3 The suggested limitation on the federal 
legislature depends on an originalist interpretation of the federal 
marriage power.4 While there was no certainty at the time of writing 
that article that such an argument would be accepted by the High 
Court of Australia, it was defensible based on dicta from earlier 
decisions of that Court.5 It was also sustainable by analogizing to 
cases where a similar argument had been accepted by the Court in 
respect of other institutions and legal constructs existing when the 
Constitution came into force in 1901.6 As to limits on the State’s 
legislative powers to make laws permitting same-sex marriage, the 
arguments rested upon a more certain foundation. Under section 
109 of the Constitution, federal legislation on a matter within federal 
power has “paramountcy”7 over any concurrent state legislation on 
the same matter.8 Regarding territory legislation, acts establishing 
 
 3. See generally Neville Rochow, “Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace”—The 
Influence of Constitutional Argument on Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Debates in Australia, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 521. 
 4.  See id. 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  See id. at 540. 
 7.  This term is used in Australian constitutional literature to denote the supremacy of 
federal legislation over state legislation when the criteria of section 109 of the Constitution 
are satisfied. 
 8. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a 
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be invalid.”). 
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federal territory legislatures provide for federal paramountcy similar 
to section 109.9 
In 2004, federal Parliament passed an amendment to the 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) that, for current purposes, had two 
significant effects. First, it introduced what had been assumed since 
Federation but not expressly provided: a traditional definition of 
marriage—namely, that “marriage” in Australia was between a man 
and a woman, entered voluntarily, to the exclusion of all others, for 
life.10 Secondly, it introduced section 88AE, which prohibited the 
recognition of so-called “same-sex” marriages solemnized overseas as 
marriages in Australia.11 The changes were remarkable in two 
respects: first, because they went contrary to trends in some 
jurisdictions towards the legal recognition of marriages without 
regard to the gender of the contracting parties; second, because their 
passage into law came about through bi-partisan support.12 Ten years 
later and with the benefit of hindsight, supporters of these changes 
regard them as revolutionary in the Orwellian sense: despite trends 
in other jurisdictions, Australia has held true to the correct principles 
that inform what describes a marriage. For opponents of same-sex 
marriage, the amendment gave them cause to celebrate: the 2004 
amendment had proven prescient as a barrier to trends that they 
would not want to see emulated in Australia. But the celebration of 
the “revolutionary” marriage amendment serves as a prelude to the 
subject matter of the present article in another way.  
By the time of the 2014 celebration, the posturing as to either of 
the constitutional arguments referred to above had been brought to 
an end by the High Court in Commonwealth v Australian Capital 
Territory, in which case the Court declared territory same-sex 
marriage legislation invalid.13 In this widely anticipated result, the 
Court unanimously held that territory legislation permitting and 
 
 9.  See, e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 28. See 
also Anne Twomey, Same-sex marriage – Inconsistency between Commonwealth and Territory 
Laws, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY (Nov. 28, 2013), available at http://sydney.edu.au/ 
law/cru/documents/2013/same_sex_marriage.pdf. 
 10.  Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5 (Austl.). 
 11.  Id. at s 88EA. 
 12.  See Marriage Amendment Bill 2004 (Austl.), available at  http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0405/05bd005. 
 13.  See generally Commonwealth v. Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 
441 (Austl.). 
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recognizing marriages without regard to gender was invalid because 
of its inconsistency with the federal Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). The 
celebration of the federal amendment and the striking down of the 
territory law was, however, tinged. In fact, the decision had a distinct 
sting in the tail for both sides of the marriage debate. Despite the 
opponents of the same-sex marriage law not intervening, the Court 
considered the originalist argument in their absence and rejected it. 
The Court also said that the way was indeed open for potential 
federal laws permitting same-sex marriage.14 Not only did the Court 
pronounce via dicta that the federal government could pass marriage 
laws without regard to gender, but also it saw no barrier to federal 
laws permitting polygamy.15 
This last pronouncement was neither anticipated nor welcomed 
by either side of the debate. Proponents of same-sex marriage have 
generally been at pains to promote their proposed reforms as but a 
very small step that should not concern anyone with regard to its 
implications. In order to win support, they generally have been 
careful to distance themselves from any suggestion of polygamy.16 
And opponents of same-sex marriage are generally opposed to any 
concept of plurality of spouses. Indeed, anything outside of what is 
regarded as traditional marriage is anathema to them. Needless to 
say, same-sex marriage opponents in Australia have looked upon 
other jurisdictions with a combination of bemusement and horror as 
they see one after the other falling prey to arguments presented in 
either courts or legislatures to re-define marriage so as to permit so-
called “marriage equality.” Not only do they deprecate what they see 
as the deception in that label, but they now fear that, over time, a 
majority of federal legislators may be persuaded to support a change 
in the federal marriage law under what they regard as its deceptive 
and beguiling influence. 
 
 14.  Id. at ¶¶ 1–2. 
 15.  Id. at ¶¶ 33–7. 
 16.  See, as an example, the opinion piece by same-sex marriage supporter and campaign 
director for Australian Marriage Equality, Rodney Croome, Marriage Equality and the 
Christian Persecution Narrative, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Aug. 15, 
2011), http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/08/15/3293123.htm. See also the 
reaction to the suggestion of a link between arguments supporting same-sex marriage and 
polygamy in the following op-ed article: Staff Writers, Bisexual Advocate Dismisses ACL Link, 
STAROBSERVER.COM (June 14, 2012), http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/bisexual-
advocate-dismisses-acl-link/79068. 
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Perhaps what was not fully appreciated at the tenth anniversary 
of Australia’s quiet revolution on marriage law was that there was a 
further reason for them to celebrate; as in all things, the decision in 
Australian Capital Territory could have been much worse. A 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, Baskin v. Bogan, demonstrates how things might have turned 
out in Australia.17 Baskin is one of the most recent of a number of 
the United States decisions that have overturned state constitutional 
provisions, to the same effect as the 2004 amendment to the 
Australian Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). Just how badly the topic of 
genderless marriage could be handled by an unsympathetic court 
cannot be appreciated without reading Baskin. Its hectoring tone 
shows the deep-seated deprecation that its members held for any 
argument in opposition to same-sex marriage. And it is that very 
tone that deprives it of any persuasive value to the objective reader. 
Both the Australian Capital Territory and Baskin decisions were 
handed down within a short time after argument,18 and both cases 
decided a similar issue but under different constitutional regimes.  
B. Confusion at Home and Bewilderment From Afar 
Both cases also contain elements that are surprising to the 
Anglo-Australian lawyer trained in the traditions of common law and 
the doctrine of stare decisis. In Australian Capital Territory, the 
surprising element is the use of dicta effectively to decide anticipated 
cases regarding issues when all proper contradictors on those issues 
were not before the Court. This has led to some startling new ways 
of viewing both stare decisis and constitutional interpretation in 
Australia. Nevertheless, the High Court ultimately left the question 
to be decided by democratic processes and through the legislative 
arm of government. In Baskin, what is surprising is not only the 
intemperate use of language in its reasons,19 but also the vaults in 
logic and fact-finding in the reasoning which are breathtaking for an 
 
 17.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. 
Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 18.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶ 44 (Austl.) 
(nine days after argument); Baskin, 766 F.3d (also nine days after argument). 
 19. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 662 (“Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing 
unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not 
produce unwanted children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go figure.”). 
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intermediate appellate court. To compound this, it appears to the 
observer from afar that members of the court have vaulted the 
separation of legislative power from judicial power and to have 
circumvented democratic processes by striking down the results of 
the referendum on grounds that appear quite tenuous. 
While the Australian Constitution also has a “full faith and 
credit” provision,20 the recent U.S. jurisprudence developments on 
same-sex marriage do not provide a coherent approach as to how the 
federal constitutional principles invoked in support can operate in 
the way these courts have said they do. 
First, there seems to be inconsistency among the respective 
courts as to how the Fourteenth Amendment applies in such cases. 
For example, a decision of another court is decided with the opposite 
outcome of Baskin despite being handed down within a day of 
Baskin and dealing with similar constitutional and legislative 
provisions.21 Furthermore, it is not at all clear to the outsider why 
the “full faith and credit” is not accorded to those state 
constitutional provisions that provide for monogamous, heterosexual 
marriage. It is not clear why the right of those who vote not to have 
same-sex marriage in the state boundaries find those rights treated as 
being automatically subservient to the rights of those who come 
from states where the vote has been cast the other way. And why 
must the according of full faith and credit extend beyond the 
individuals involved to overturn the democratic processes of the 
entire state? 
Second, when the same question in the United States is framed 
under different constitutional and rights structures, such as in 
Europe and Australia, the highest courts of these areas come to the 
opposite conclusion. How does the Fourteenth Amendment operate 
differently in the United States so that the U.S. courts come to such 
different conclusions from the European Court of Human Rights on 
the issue of the State’s right to re-define marriage when both 
jurisdictions are purporting to correctly interpret bills of rights? Can 
this merely be a question of different words in the rights-conferring 
 
 20. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 118 (“Full faith and credit shall be given, 
throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial 
proceeding of every State.”). 
 21.  Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 913 (E.D. La. 2014). 
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instruments giving rise to different rights or could it be that there is 
some political agenda being played out in the courts?22 
III. VINDICATION OF THE AMENDMENT IN 2004: 
COMMONWEALTH V. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
The Australian Capital Territory case resolved the debate on 
who could change marriage laws in Australia. As with probably every 
revolution, the amendment to the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) was not 
universally popular. There persisted, until recently, an argument that 
the federal Act still permitted entry by states and territories into the 
legislative field of marriage so that each local legislature could, if it so 
chose, pass an Act permitting gender-neutral marriage in its own 
state or territory and recognize such marriages if contracted 
elsewhere.23 Though apparently difficult for some gender-neutral 
proponents to accept,24 the position taken in the Parliament in 2004 
was vindicated by the High Court in Australian Capital Territory. 
The amendment had the desired effect. There would be no same-sex 
marriage in Australia while its provisions remain in force. 
A. Background to Commonwealth v. Australian Capital Territory  
A previous article describes the polemics and history of same-sex 
marriage in Australia.25 In short, each of the Australian States that 
proposed legislation permitting so-called same-sex marriage in their 
jurisdiction were persuaded not to pass such a law.26 
One policy reason for Australia not to follow other jurisdictions 
in permitting same-sex marriage may be that since the 1970s and 
progressively up to 2008, there has been a process of removal of 
distinctions in laws regulating unmarried domestic partnerships that 
 
 22.  See generally Hämäläinen v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014). 
 23.  Rochow, supra note 1. 
 24.  At the time of writing there have been reports of another bill being prepared for 
presentation in the Norfolk Island legislature. Norfolk Island Gay Marriage Bid ‘Safe’, 
NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 17, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-
news/norfolk-island-considers-gay-marriage/story-e6frfku9-1227061263356. Indications are 
that this bill would be defeated through the political process. 
 25.  Rochow, supra note 1. 
 26.  Id. at 529. 
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are heterosexual or homosexual.27 In fact, state laws even accord 
rights in property in financial awards to multiple party 
relationships.28 Where there were remaining areas of discrimination, 
they were dealt with in 2008 by a suite of federal legislation to 
remove all differences other than the case of marriage and, in most 
states, adoption.29 
As mentioned, foremost among the legal arguments that were 
accepted by those States was that any such legislation would be 
invalid pursuant to section 109 of the Australian Constitution.30 That 
section operates to invalidate any state legislation that is inconsistent 
with federal legislation on the same subject matter.31 It was accepted 
by the state legislatures that sought submissions that any venture 
into the legislative field of “marriage” would be inconsistent with the 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) because that Act had shown an intention 
to operate as a complete code on the subject. That included, as a 
 
 27.  There has been a long succession of legislation at both state and federal level over 
some decades seeking to equate, as far as possible, both married and unmarried relationships, 
without regard to their heterosexual or homosexual nature. They have had the cumulative 
effect of providing the same economic and proprietary outcomes, irrespective of the status of 
the relationship, in areas of taxation, superannuation and property settlements. See Same-Sex 
Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-General Law Reform) Act 2008 
(Austl.); Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-Superannuation) 
Act 2008 (Austl.); Property Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vic) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships 
Act 1996 (SA) (Austl.); Local Government Act 1995 (WA) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships 
Act 1991 (NT) (Austl.); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.); Property (Relationships) 
Act 1984 (NSW) (Austl.); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) (Austl.); Maintenance Act 1967 (Tas) 
(Austl.); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) (Austl.). 
 28.  See supra note 27; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 90SM (Austl.).  As an example, the 
definition of “de facto relationship” in section 3 of the De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA) 
(Austl.) contemplates more than one person satisfying the criteria with any particular partner. 
There is thus no restriction to monogamous relationships in the Act. Id. 
 29. See Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-General Law 
Reform) Act 2008 (Austl.); Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-
Superannuation) Act 2008 (Austl.); Property Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vict.) (Austl.); De 
Facto Relationships Act 1996 (S. Austl.); Local Government Act 1995 (W. Austl.); De Facto 
Relationships Act 1991 (N. Terr.) (Austl.); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.); Property 
(Relationships) Act 1984 (N.S.W.) (Austl.); Succession Act 1981 (Queensl.) 
(Austl.); Maintenance Act 1967 (Tas.) (Austl.); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 
(N.S.W.) (Austl.).  
 30.  See Twomey, supra note 9; AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109. 
 31.  Id. (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the 
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.”); 
Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 48–61 (Austl.). 
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consequence of the 2004 amendment, the definition of marriage.32 
Any entry into that legislative field by a state would be invalid. All of 
the states showed a reluctance to run the risk of their laws being 
challenged and invalidated by the High Court. 
The only exception to this reluctance was the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT). That territory has a seventeen-member unicameral 
Legislative Assembly and enjoys self-government subject to certain 
constraints imposed legislatively and constitutionally. Among the 
constraints is section 28 of the Australian Capital Territory (Self-
Government) Act 1988.33 For all practical purposes, section 28 has a 
similar effect for territory legislation as section 109 has for 
state legislation. 
Prior to the 2012 territory election, the Labor Government of 
the Australian Capital Territory had governed as a minority party 
with support of the Greens.34 The Greens have long had a policy of 
so-called “marriage equality.” Apparently as part of the price for 
continued support from the Greens, the ACT Labor government 
went to the polls in 2012 with a policy that it would legislate for 
same-sex marriage in the territory if re-elected. It was returned by 
the narrowest of margins,35 needing support from the Greens in 
order to govern. On September 19, 2013, the ACT Attorney-
General introduced the Marriage Equality (Same-Sex) Act Bill 2013 
into the chamber.36 With support of the Greens, the legislation was 
 
 32.  See Olivia Rundle, An examination of relationship registration schemes in Australia,  
25 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 121, 126–7 (2011). Marriage Amendment Act 2004 ch 1 s 5(1) (Austl.) 
(“Marriage means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily 
entered into for life.”). 
 33.  Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth). 
 34.  The Greens are an Australian Political Party, ostensibly formed to protect the 
environment from legislation and governmental policies that would otherwise be to what the 
party’s members consider its detriment. The policies of the party range much more widely and 
generally take the extreme liberal position on moral and social issues such as abortion, 
euthanasia and same-sex marriage. See generally THE GREENS, http://greens.org.au/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
 35.  That is with only 41 more votes on the popular vote and with an equal number of 
seats to the Liberal opposition under the Hare-Clarke electoral system which operates in the 
Australian Capital Territory. See ELECTIONS ACT, 2012 RESULTS BY ELECTORATE AND BY 
PARTY (2012),  http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_legislative_ 
assembly_elections/2012_act_legislative_assembly_election/2012_election_results2/2012_res
ults_by_electorate_and_by_party. 
 36.  Santilla Chingaipe, ACT to Push Ahead with Gay Marriage Laws, SBS WORLD 
NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/10/22/act-push-ahead-
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passed into law on October 22, 2013.37 It was to come into 
operation on November 7, 2013 and the first marriages would be 
permitted on December 7, 2013.38 
There was strong opposition to the bill not only from the Liberal 
Party opposition, but also within the community.39 One of the 
reasons for opposition among sections of the community included 
the social policy arguments mounted and championed by religious 
groups. Religious leaders from several different faith traditions 
signed a joint letter sent by the Australian Christian Lobby to 
Attorney General Corbell protesting the bill and its anticipated social 
and legal consequences.40 
The managing director of the Australian Christian Lobby, Lyle 
Shelton, raised a specific concern with the Attorney General 
regarding people of faith not being able, in conscience, to support 
same-sex marriages in the supply of goods or services.41 The response 
 
gay-marriage-laws; Cec Busby, Same-Sex Marriage Bill Passes in ACT, GAY NEWS NETWORK 
(Oct. 22 2013), http://gaynewsnetwork.com.au/news/national/same-sex-marriage-bill-
passes-in-act-12193.html; Marriage Equality (Same-Sex) Act Bill 2013 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 37.  See supra note 36. 
 38.  See supra note 36; Katherine Murphy, High court to hear challenge to ACT same sex 
marriage laws in December, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/nov/04/high-court-to-hear-challenge-to-act-
same-sex-marriage-laws-in-december. 
 39.  Lisa Cox & Peter Jean, Rush to Save Gay Marriage Bill, CANBERRATIMES.COM.AU 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/rush-to-save-gay-marriage-
bill-20131021-2vxek.html; Elizabeth Byrne, High Court throws out ACT’s same-sex marriage 
laws, ABC NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-12/high-court-
decision-on-act-same-sex-marriage-laws/5152168. 
 40.  See Cox & Jean, supra note 39. The following leaders specifically spoke out against 
the Bill: Rabbi Shimon Cowen; Bishop Trevor Edwards, vicar general of the Anglican Diocese 
of Canberra and Goulburn; Monsignor John Woods, administrator of the Catholic 
Archdiocese of Canberra and Goulburn; Pastor Sean Stanton, of Australian Christian 
Churches; Rabbi Shmuel Feldman; Pastor B.J. Hayes, of the Canberra National Adventist 
Church; Imam Adama Konda, of the Canberra Islamic Centre; and Arnold Cummins, stake 
president in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. They were joined by Lyle Shelton, 
managing director of the Australian Christian Lobby. Id. 
 41.  For a case note by the author about a recent example of this, see Same-sex Marriage 
and Property Rights Compete in New York State, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME AUSTRALIA, 
available at http://www.nd.edu.au/sydney/schools/law/on-the-case/on-the-case-issue-7. 
Otherwise, see the excellent commentary on this type of issue in my colleague Associate 
Professor Foster’s paper. Neil J. Foster, Discrimination, Language and Freedom of Religion: 
Two Important Law and Religion decisions in Australia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW 
AND RELIGION STUDIES, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY “VARIETIES OF SECULARISM, 
RELIGION AND LAW” OCT. 5–7, 2014. Neil J. Foster, Sesame Street and the Gay Cake, LAW 
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from the Attorney-General confirmed the worst fears of Mr. Shelton 
and the religious leaders: 
[A]ny right to express contrary opinions is balanced under sections 
7 and 20 of the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). It would be 
unlawful for those who provide goods, services and facilities in the 
wedding industry to discriminate against another person on the 
basis of their sexuality or their relationship status. This includes 
discrimination by refusing to provide or make available those 
goods, services or facilities. Australians are free to express contrary 
views as the church leaders and the Australian Christian Lobby has 
[sic] done, provided they do so within the law.42 
Given the resolution of the ACT government to proceed with 
the bill, members of the Australian community, both within and 
outside of the ACT, asked for the recently elected federal Liberal 
government to challenge the Act, in the High Court, once it became 
law.43 A case was reserved under section 18 of the Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth). Argument was heard on December 3, 2013. The Full Bench44 
heard the case and delivered their reasons on December 12, 2013.45 
Prior to the hearing, religious leaders and faith-based groups, 
including the Australian Christian Lobby and the Australian Family 
Association, gave consideration to seeking leave to intervene.46 
 
AND RELIGION AUSTRALIA (May 23, 2015), https://lawandreligionaustralia.wordpress.com/ 
category/sexual-orientation-discrimination/; See also Jordan Pendergrass, Symposium 2014: 
Australia, BYU LAW INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES, 
http://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=2&linkId=246&contentId=2126&blurbId=35404. 
 42.  Letter from Simon Corbell, Attorney-General, Australian Capital Territory, to Lyle 
Shelton, Managing Director, Australian Christian Lobby (Nov. 21, 2013) (on file 
with author). 
 43.  Interview by the author with Ms. Giulia Jones, MLC Australian Capital Territory 
Legislative Assembly (Nov. 2015); Interview by the author with Mr. Lyle Shelton, Australian 
Christian Lobby (Nov. 2015); Interview by the author with Elder Jeffrey Cummings, The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Nov. 2015). 
 44.  Generally a full bench consists of seven justices, but because newly appointed 
Justice Gageler had, prior to appointment, recently advised the ACT government that it could 
not validly pass legislation of the kind, his Honor recused himself, leaving a bench of six. See 
Transcript of Hearing, Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441 
(Austl.), available at http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/other/HCATrans/2013/299.html 
[hearinafter Commonwealth v ACT Hearing Transcript]; see also Twomey, supra note 9, at 13; 
Infra note 56. 
 45.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441 (Austl.). 
 46.  Interview by the author with Lyle Shelton of the Australian Christian Lobby and 
Terri Kelleher of the Australian Family Association (Nov. 2015). 
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However, they were dissuaded from doing so by the federal 
government on the basis that doing so may work as a distraction 
from the central arguments the government wished to present.47 In 
the case, the only intervention sought and granted was by Marriage 
Equality Australia, a homosexual rights activist group, which 
presented arguments in support of the ACT legislation. 
B. The Decision in Commonwealth v. ACT 
A unanimous Court handed down its judgment and reasoning, 
holding that the Act was invalid.48 The Court held that the whole of 
the Act had to be struck down because it was inconsistent with the 
Marriage Act within the meaning of section 28 of the Australian 
Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 and, as a consequence, 
had no effect.49 The Court held that the Marriage Act, as amended 
in 2004, provided a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the 
law in respect of marriage in Australia.50 No territorial legislation 
could accord any relationship the status of marriage inconsistent with 
the Act.51 If this were to be considered a victory by those who 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Commonwealth, 88 HCA at 21. 
 49.  Id. at 19–20. 
 50.  Id.; see also Twomey, supra note 9. 
 51.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 57–9 
(Austl.) (“The Marriage Act regulates the creation and recognition of the legal status of 
marriage throughout Australia. The Act's definition of marriage sets the bounds of that legal 
status within the topic of juristic classification with which the Act deals. Read as a whole, the 
Marriage Act, at least in the form in which it now stands, makes the provisions which it does 
about marriage as a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the law with respect to the 
creation and recognition of the legal status of marriage. Why otherwise was the Marriage Act 
amended, as it was in 2004, by introducing a definition of marriage in the form which now 
appears, except for the purpose of demonstrating that the federal law on marriage was to be 
complete and exhaustive? The 2004 amendments to the Marriage Act made plain (if it was not 
already plain) that the federal marriage law is a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the 
law of marriage (emphasis added). Those amendments applied the newly introduced definition 
of marriage to the provisions governing solemnisation of marriage and gave effect to that 
definition in the provisions governing the recognition of marriages solemnised outside 
Australia. Section 88EA of the Marriage Act (inserted by the 2004 amendments) provides 
expressly that a union solemnised in a foreign country between persons of the same sex must 
not be recognised as a marriage in Australia. These particular provisions of the Marriage Act, 
read in the context of the whole Act, necessarily contain the implicit negative proposition that 
the kind of marriage provided for by the Act is the only kind of marriage that may be formed 
or recognised in Australia.”); See also Olivia Rundle, An Examination of Relationship 
Registration Schemes in Australia, 25 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 126 (2011) (quoting Garfield 
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opposed the concept of genderless marriage, there was, as 
mentioned, troubling discourse in the reasoning. 
During argument, the solicitor-general for the Commonwealth 
was asked whether, on his argument, it was necessary to decide the 
extent of the federal marriage power.52 Mr. Gleeson SC submitted 
that it was not necessary.53 However, when pressed, he reluctantly 
made the concession that the power, as a plenary power, was likely 
not confined by an originalist interpretation to marriage as it was 
understood in 1900, just prior to the Constitution coming into 
operation. The ACT argued that the originalist interpretation was 
the correct construction of the head of power and thus that it left 
legislative space for the ACT legislation because same-sex marriage 
was not contemplated in 1900.54 The Court justified its interest in 
this issue in observing that if the boundaries of the power were not 
known, it may be possible for the ACT law to operate concurrently 
and not offend section 28.55 
The curiosity of the Court and the submissions of the ACT, 
supported as they were by Marriage Equality Australia and not 
challenged by any contradictor, resulted in the Court proceeding 
 
Barwick, The Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961, 3 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 277 (1961)) 
(stating the purpose of the legislation was to “produce a marriage code suitable to present day 
Australian needs”). 
 52.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶ 50 (Austl.). 
 53.  Id.; Commonwealth v ACT Hearing Transcript, supra note 44 includes the 
following exchange between Mr. J.T. Gleason and  Justice Hayne: 
HAYNE J: Questions of constitutional power cannot go by 
concession, can they, Mr Solicitor? 
MR GLEESON: Your Honour, we accept entirely the thrust of these 
matters. First of all, we have put something as the better view. The ACT 
commends that view. The intervener enthusiastically commends that view. 
The Court does not have a contradictor on that question. The Court 
would not decide any matter merely on agreement. That is just not on, 
absolutely not on. If the matter needs to be decided, the Court will 
decide it and what I had proposed to do, given there was not a 
contradictor, was to identify what I will call the narrow argument and 
then deal with what I will call the broader argument. 
So I will seek to identify both those arguments, there being no 
contradictor. But I do not retreat from the proposition that because our 
law on any view has stayed on the right side of the relevant part of the 
circumference of the circle, it is either at the circumference or it is inside 
it. In that sense, it is not necessary to decide the constitutional question. 
 54.  Id. at ¶¶ 19–21, 29–38. 
 55.  Id. at ¶¶ 3, 9. 
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into an area that the Commonwealth and those who oppose 
genderless marriage would have preferred left untouched. Contrary 
to what it had previously observed in relation to institutional 
concepts such as trademarks, juries, and marriage, it now found 
obiter that any originalist argument would have to be rejected.56 The 
Commonwealth head of power extended the legalization of same-sex 
marriage. It observed that the marriage head of power in the 
Constitution gave the federal Parliament power not only to provide 
for same-sex marriage but for the recognition of any form of 
marriage between natural persons.57  
In its exploration of the issue, it made the logical connection that 
the supporters of genderless marriage have long been seeking to 
avoid; namely, that there is no distinction between same-sex marriage 
and polygamous marriage: 
The formal requirements to establish the union, and thus the 
legally recognised status of marriage, may be very simple (for 
example, no more than the exchange of certain promises before 
witnesses). The rights and obligations which stem from that status 
will commonly include rights and obligations about maintenance 
and support, succession to and ownership of property (both as 
between the parties to the marriage and between the parties and 
others) and, if there are children of the union, rights and 
obligations in relation to them. 
The social institution of marriage differs from country to country. 
It is not now possible (if it ever was) to confine attention to 
jurisdictions whose law of marriage provides only for unions 
between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, 
voluntarily entered into for life. Marriage law is and must be 
recognised now to be more complex. Some jurisdictions outside 
Australia permit polygamy. Some jurisdictions outside Australia, in 
a variety of constitutional settings, now permit marriage between 
same sex couples.58 
 
 56.  See supra note 1. 
 57.  AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxi). 
 58.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 34–
5 (Austl.). 
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C. Criticisms of the Court’s Approach in Commonwealth v. ACT 
This decision created multiple problems. First, it opened up a 
political debate about what other forms of marriage the state should 
recognize. Second, it created uncertainty on when groups should 
intervene in cases. Third, it will lead to difficult challenges between 
same-sex marriage and religious business individuals. Fourth, it dealt 
with issues unnecessary to its final decision. Finally, it created a new 
method of constitutional interpretation that brings with it 
inherent uncertainty. 
First, the decision effectively turned the issue of defining 
marriage into a political matter for the federal Parliament to resolve. 
It may have also fueled the debate as to just how “equal” the law 
could purport to be that singled out same-gender marriage as what is 
permitted by the law—more than the polygamous genie that has 
been let out of the marriage-power bottle. The debate is now 
genuinely raised as to why there should be criminal sanctions against 
incestuous relationships and why there should be any lower limit on 
the age for consenting to marriage.59  
Second, the decision not only created political and sociological 
dilemmas for legislators, it also necessarily creates new uncertainties 
for constitutional lawyers and for those considering intervention in 
any existing High Court action.60 The intervention of Marriage 
Equality Australia in the proceedings and the quandary created by 
the dicta has left religious groups wondering whether the outcome 
might not have been different had they intervened after all.61 Since 
the Australian High Court’s decision, it seems that many religious 
groups are now of the view that they can no longer afford not to 
 
  59. See Louise Hall, Judge Compares Incest and Paedophilia to Past Attitudes Towards 
Homosexuality, Claiming They Might Not Be Taboo Anymore, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 
10, 2014),  http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/judge-compares-incest-and-paedophilia-to-past-
attitudes-towards-homosexuality-claiming-they-might-not-be-taboo-anymore-20140709-
zt0v2.html; Justin Huggler, Incest a ‘Fundamental Right,’ German Committee Says, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ 
germany/11119062/Incest-a-fundamental-right-German-committee-says.html; Bridget Brennan, 
Teen Prevented From Flying Overseas “For Arranged Marriage,” AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-28/teen-prevented-
from-flying-overseas-for-arranged-marriage/5774364?WT.ac=localnews_sydney. 
 60.  AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxi). 
 61.  Supra note 46. 
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apply for leave to intervene when cases that may have implications 
for religious freedom will be heard.62  
Third, as would be apparent from the letter from the Attorney 
General63 and from the following analysis,64 the questions 
surrounding same-sex marriage and discrimination against those in 
homosexual relationships have become inextricably linked with 
questions of freedom of conscience and religious freedom.65 For 
example, a forced “tolerance” for same-sex marriages has risen to a 
new level in what has come to be referred to as the “butcher, baker 
and candlestick maker” cases.66 Despite assurances that clergy will 
not be compelled to render their services or make available their 
facilities to solemnize marriages of homosexual couples contrary to 
their conscience, the laity of their congregations—equally people of 
conscience—find themselves required to trade contrary to their 
conscience. They cannot withhold support for homosexual wedding 
ceremonies by declining to supply goods or services even though 
their religious leaders are not required to do so. As I have noted 
elsewhere, same-sex marriage rights have recently been held in New 
York State to trump property rights.67 Professor Anne Twomey 
recently noted that Commonwealth v ACT has not been critically 
analyzed for its implications in “butcher, baker and candlestick 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Supra note 41; Commonwealth, 88 HCA at 21; Twomey, supra note 9. 
 64.  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE REPORT 
INTO THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 (Cth) §§ 2.28−29 (Austl.) 
[hereinafter FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 COMMITTEE REPORT], available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constituti
onal_Affairs/Recognition_of_Foreign_Marriages_Bill_2014/~/media/Committees/legcon_ct
te/Recognition_of_Foreign_Marriages_Bill_2014/report/report.pdf; See, e.g., Christian Youth 
Camps Ltd. v Cobaw & Ors (2014) 308 ALR 615 (Austl.). 
 67.  See Neville Rochow, Same-Sex Marriage and Property Rights Compete in New York 
State, in ON THE CASE ISSUE 7, available at http://www.nd.edu.au/sydney/schools/law/on-
the-case/on-the-case-issue-7. In this case, the right to grant entry onto land owned and 
operated by the corporate respondent and its directors was held not to extend to the telephone 
call in which the complainants were informed that because of devout Catholic beliefs of the 
directors they would be unable to hire out their facility. Their right to refuse entry was 
abrogated by the relevant discriminatory laws protecting the sensibilities of the 
complainants. Id. 
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maker” cases or its relation to the interpretation of 
the Constitution.68  
Fourth, the High Court decided matters beyond those necessary 
to decide the case.69 In addition to the dicta contained in ACT’s 
reasoning,70 Professor Twomey is critical of the High Court 
unnecessarily going beyond the immediate decision for the case. 
None of the parties before the Court placed the validity of the 
Marriage Act at issue.71 Since that was not at issue, the only question 
legitimately before the Court was that of the inconsistency of the 
Territory Act with the federal Act, not a hypothetical question as to 
how far the legislature might be permitted to go in regulations 
regarding marriage.72 
Professor Twomey observed: 
Their Honours contended that it was necessary to decide whether s 
51(xxi) permits the Commonwealth Parliament to enact “a law 
with respect to same sex marriage because the ACT Act would 
probably operate concurrently with the Marriage Act if the federal 
Parliament had no power to make a national law providing for 
same sex marriage.” It is hard to see how this could be the case, 
given that court had earlier stated that the object of the ACT Act 
was to “provide for marriage equality for same sex couples, not for 
some form of legally recognised relationship which is relevantly 
different from the relationship of marriage which the federal laws 
provide for and recognize.” If this is so, then how could an ACT 
law establishing the status of “marriage” for same sex couples, 
operate concurrently with the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), if both the 
Constitution and the Marriage Act defined marriage exclusively as 
unions between people of the opposite sex and the Commonwealth 
law covered the field of “marriage”?73 
Her point is a telling one. A law that defines, for example, 
particular types of intellectual property as the only species of 
 
 68. Anne Twomey, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Interpretation, 88 AUSTL. L. 
J. 613, 613–16 (2014). 
 69.  Id. at 613. 
 70.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 48–61 
(Austl.); See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 71.  Twomey, supra note 68, at 613–14. 
 72.  Id. at 613. 
 73.  Id. at 613–14 (citations omitted). 
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property that can be so defined, if valid, would leave no legislative 
space for a state or territory to supplement the list of species of 
property that may be described as “intellectual property.” There 
would be no need, in such a case, for a court to conjecture as to 
whether the Commonwealth could have added a specific supplement 
to the list or even to conjecture more broadly at all. That legislative 
route would be foreclosed to all other legislatures by virtue of the 
Commonwealth having pronounced exclusivity. The provisions of 
section 88AE of the Marriage Act could have been widened to add 
states and territories same-sex marriages to those foreign marriages 
that are forbidden recognition in Australia. But given that in 2004 
there was no announced prospect of state- or territory-based 
marriages, the intention of exclusivity of heterosexual marriage under 
the Marriage Act amendments was clear enough.74 It is 
understandable that the Court should wish to deal with the 
obviously related question of the extent of the legislative power in 
respect to marriage so that it could return the question back to the 
Parliament. But to do so without appropriate contradictors on each 
of the aspects of this question was unusual and not helpful in the 
long run to the conduct of the common law adversarial system. 
Fifth, the High Court introduced a new method of 
constitutional interpretation, “topics of juristic classification,” which 
brings inherent uncertainty.75 Professor Twomey criticized the 
dismissal of originalist arguments, not joined properly in the 
arguments heard by the Court.76  The contention that “marriage” 
should mean the same thing as it had meant in 1900 was 
dismissed peremptorily: 
The utility of adopting or applying a single all-embracing theory of 
constitutional interpretation has been denied. This case does not 
require examination of those theories or the resolution of any 
conflict, real or supposed, between them. The determinative 
question in this case is whether s 51(xxi) is to be construed as 
referring only to the particular legal status of “marriage” which 
could be formed at the time of federation (having the legal content 
which it had according to English law at that time) or as using the 
 
 74.  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 75.  Twomey, supra note 68, at 613. 
 76.  Twomey, supra note 68, at 614–15. 
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word “marriage” in the sense of a “topic of juristic classification”. 
For the reasons that follow, the latter construction should be 
adopted. Debates cast in terms like “originalism” or “original 
intent” (evidently intended to stand in opposition to 
“contemporary meaning”) with their echoes of very different 
debates in other jurisdictions are not to the point and serve only to 
obscure much more than they illuminate.77 
 As Professor Twomey noted, “[i]n doing so, [the court] seemed 
to regard such interpretative approaches as mysterious foreign 
distractions that were irrelevant to its own past reasoning.”78 
Instead, it developed a new method of interpretation, not 
previously used or heard of: it decided that marriage was a “topic of 
juristic classification” that included “laws of a kind ‘generally 
considered for comparative law and private international law, as 
being the subjects of a country’s marriage laws.’”79 By this 
pronouncement, the High Court held that “the meaning of marriage 
for constitutional purposes is to be interpreted by reference to the 
scope of marriage laws in other countries”80 rather than by what was 
understood by the concept of marriage in 1900.81 By this new 
method of constitutional interpretation, the High Court introduced 
a new set of imponderables to be explored the next time that it 
examines the extent of the marriage power. It changed the power 
from one that is a juristic concept accepted in Christian nations to 
one that embraces marriage as it is understood, in all of its 
dimensions, in any number of nations. 
This new concept of “juristic classification” as a method of 
constitutional interpretation brings inherent uncertainty, whereas 
previously it was used only pejoratively.82 Professor Twomey noted 
that the only instance of using “a ‘topic of juristic classification” as a 
means of interpreting a constitutional term appears to be the 
dissenting judgment of Windeyer J, in Attorney-General (Vic) v 
 
 77.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, para 14 
(Austl.) (citations omitted). 
 78.  Twomey, supra note 68, at 614. 
 79.  Id. (citing ACT 250 CLR, para 22). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶ 23 (Austl.); 
see also Twomey, supra note 68, at 614. 
 82.  Twomey, supra note 68, at 615. 
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Commonwealth”83 (the “Marriage Act Case”). In this case, his 
Honor referred to the “concept of marriage that is universal in all 
systems of law that participate in” a shared “inheritance of European 
Christian civilisation.”84 In this reference, his Honour appeared to be 
adopting what would be termed an “originalist” approach 
to interpretation.85 
Professor Twomey was, with respect, quite correct when she said 
that the High Court could have used more orthodox methods of 
constitutional interpretation to achieve the same outcome. And most 
importantly, she observed that adopting the novel concept of 
“juristic classification,” has left unexplained why “marriage” has been 
separated out from other institutional concepts that had previously 
received an originalist interpretation such as “court” and “jury.”86 
She observed in conclusion: 
As same-sex marriage has not been recognised yet in a 
majority of countries, it would appear that this topic of juristic 
classification can be affected by the laws of a minority of countries 
and as the High Court understandably is no longer prepared to 
draw distinctions between countries, such as “Christian countries” 
and others, then the potential is opened for laws of even the most 
oppressive countries to affect a topic of juristic classification in 
Australia. Moreover, as noted above, it seems that some aspects of 
the constitutional meaning of marriage can be changed by 
reference to laws adopted in other countries (such as polygamy and 
same-sex marriage) but that other aspects, such as the consensual 
nature of marriage and the intention that it endure, remain 
immutable and unaffected by foreign law. No explanation was 
given as to why this was so, leaving this new method of 
constitutional interpretation shrouded in uncertainty. 
. . . . The risk of establishing new methods of constitutional 
interpretation is that one can never be sure where they might lead. 
While the most likely outcome is that the pool of topics of juristic 
classification will remain stagnant with no new entries, this 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529, 578 (Austl.) 
(Windeyer, J., dissenting). 
 85. Twomey, supra note 68, at 615. 
 86.  Id. at 615−16. 
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judgment might yet give birth to more surprising developments in 
the future.87 
Whatever other consequences of the decision in Commonwealth v 
ACT, two are certain: first, that the matter of same-sex marriage has 
now been returned to the federal Parliament as a political issue; 
second, that future cases involving homosexual rights will attract 
applications for intervention from both sides of the debate. But the 
consequences in ACT did not extend as far as those in Baskin. 
IV. BASKIN V. BOGAN; WOLF V. WALKER88 
While the courts in ACT and Baskin were both deciding similar 
issues and coming to opposite conclusions, the approaches could not 
be more different. Despite the criticisms made by both Professor 
Twomey and me, the High Court adopted and maintained the 
legalistic approach that it is known for. In contrast, in Baskin, the 
circuit court embarked upon inquiries into factual matters the 
relevance of which is not altogether obvious to the issue decided. It 
does so reaching conclusions that would seem to be either contrary 
to known evidence or that would, despite the reasoning available on 
the record, remain contestable. Also, if the reasons for the decision 
are a true guide to the arguments put to the court by the states, they 
seem to have omitted a number of quite obvious arguments. This 
section will begin by addressing some general, broad criticisms of the 
Baskin decision before moving on to specific arguments that the 
court relied on to justify same-sex marriage without regard to 
evidence that ran contrary to the court’s conclusions. 
A. General Criticism of Baskin 
Baskin had several major flaws. First, it made unsupported 
predictions about the trend of same-sex marriage. Second, it 
assumed that it was in the best position to know a state’s purpose in 
supporting heterosexual marriages.  
 
 87.  Id. 
 88. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. 
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 
316 (2014). 
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That the decision was going to be controversial is evident from 
the first line when Judge Posner, delivering the opinion on behalf of 
the court, makes a prediction as to the trend of same-sex marriage in 
the United States. “Indiana and Wisconsin are among the shrinking 
majority of states that do not recognize the validity of same-sex 
marriages, whether contracted in these states or in states (or foreign 
countries) where they are lawful.”89 The prediction implicit in the 
adjective “shrinking” predicts not only political outcomes, but also 
judicial outcomes at first instance on appeal to intermediate courts90 
and, of course, the now well-publicized case of Kitchen v. Herbert 
regarding the validity of Utah’s heterosexual marriage laws, 
enshrined in its constitution.91 
In the next paragraph of the decision, the controversial nature of 
the reasoning and decision is confirmed: 
Formally, these cases are about discrimination against the small 
homosexual minority in the United States. But at a deeper level, as 
we shall see, they are about the welfare of American children. The 
argument that the states press hardest in defense of their 
prohibition of same-sex marriage is that the only reason the 
government encourages marriage is to induce heterosexuals to 
marry so that there will be fewer “accidental births,” which when 
they occur outside of marriage often lead to the abandonment of 
the child to the mother (unaided by the father) or to foster care. 
Overlooked by this argument is that many of those abandoned 
children are adopted by homosexual couples, and those children 
would be better off both emotionally and economically if their 
adoptive parents were married.92 
For a lawyer not as well acquainted with Fourteenth Amendment 
issues central to this case as American lawyers would be, the first 
surprise of this case is why the court is permitting parties to embark 
on this kind of factual defense of the legislature’s will. In Australia, 
this type of question would be the subject of a parliamentary inquiry 
through an appropriate committee. This was the case in the recently 
 
 89. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 653. 
 90.  Such as the decision that went contrary to the prediction in Robicheaux v. 
Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014). 
 91.  961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014); stay 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014). 
 92.  Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654. 
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released Senate inquiry into whether a bill for the recognition in 
Australia of foreign same-sex marriages should be passed, upon 
inquiry and consideration of the evidence. On the evidence, the 
Senate did not recommend that the bill be passed.93 Unless a 
legislature has acted beyond its constitutional power, the reasons for 
the law would seem to be a matter for the legislature.94  
Second, if such an inquiry is relevant under the American 
constitutional Fourteenth Amendment principle of “reasonable 
basis,” then surely the argument above, as explained by Judge 
Posner, could not possibly have been the best argument that could 
have been put forward by the states. Evaluative evidence as to what 
is in the best interests of the community, particularly children, is 
available now in a number of well-documented longitudinal studies. 
And the argument would not just be one of encouraging marriage, 
surely, but of the welfare of children in marriages where there are 
parents of both genders, ideally their biological parents. Allied to 
this, at the community level, is the impact that same-sex marriage has 
had on existing freedoms, among which the rights to freedom of 
conscience and freedom of religious practice are foremost. It is now 
well established in American jurisprudence, to which I will return,95 
that in this contest of rights, both freedoms suffer. 
Third, the judicial assertion begs yet a further question; whether 
all types of marriages are in the best interests of the child. But even 
assuming such a question were to be the subject of the court’s 
inquiry, how does an intermediate court of appeal ascertain those 
facts on what are clearly contentious and complex questions of 
sociological fact and data collection? This judicial assertion is as 
astounding for its peremptory dismissal of the argument that 
provoked it as it is for the forensic leaps that inhere in it. 
 
 93. FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 66, at ss 
2.55−2.56, at 17. Details of the Bill are available at: http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s963. 
 94.  FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 66, at s 2.55, 
at 17. 
 95.  See infra text accompanying notes 277 et seq. 
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B. Baskin’s Faulty Reasoning 
In the criticism made here of Baskin, first is a consolidation of 
general criticisms made of the decision by the conservative Internet 
commentators together with my own observations.96 I then turn to 
some specific criticisms that could be leveled at the case from an 
Australian perspective, including evidence that does not appear to 
have been considered by the Court.97  
The reasoning of Judge Posner seems to rest on four critical 
points. First, infertility does not prevent other couples from 
marrying. Second, homosexuality is an inherited orientation. Third, 
same-sex marriage does no harm to the existing institution of 
marriage. Fourth, same-sex marriages will benefit children. On each 
of these points, the reasoning is superficial. 
1. Infertile couples 
First, the court dismissed the State’s arguments in favor of 
heterosexual marriage in part because of the issue of the infertility of 
homosexual marriages.98 If the reasons fairly represent the argument 
as made, it seems the argument was rather poorly framed. But the 
 
 96.  Unlike the ACT case, the decision in Baskin has received criticism from a number 
of conservative Internet commentators who have criticized it as being amoral pro-homosexual 
marriage polemic. See Baskin 766 F.3d; Michael Cook, A Deeply Amoral Deference of Same-Sex 
Marriage, CONJUGALITY (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.mercatornet.com/conjugality/ 
view/14767; State is “Fake Church” Imposing its Own Form of Morality on All, THE 
CHRISTIAN INST., (Sept. 22 1014), http://www.christian.org.uk/news/state-is-fake-church-
imposing-its-own-form-of-morality-on-all/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed& 
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+christianinstitutereligiousliberty+%28The+Christian+Institute+%C2
%BB+Religious+liberty%29&utm_content=FeedBurner. In fairness, it should be noted that 
pro-gay websites have praised the decision as an unanswerable disposal of all of the arguments 
against same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Michelle Dean, Hero Federal Appeals Judge Burns Down the 
Case Against Gay Marriage, GAWKER (Sept. 5, 2014, 9:49 AM), http://gawker.com/hero-
federal-appeals-judge-burns-down-the-case-against-1630697112. 
 97.  It should be noted that much of the alleged financial and proprietary discrimination 
that is considered in the reasons would not be relevant in Australia because of the state and 
federal legislation to which I have already referred.  See supra note 27. Those are matters on 
which I cannot be critical of the Court. It seems rather an omission of the respective 
legislatures to have made any allowance in the law for the manner in which people in 
relationships outside marriage may want to arrange their affairs. It may be this oversight on the 
part of lawmakers that explains the haste with which same-sex marriage was adopted in the 
United States. 
 98.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub 
nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
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judicial riposte is equally jejune. Judge Posner points out that 
Indiana bans marriages of first cousins until they are well past the age 
of procreation at age sixty-five. “Elderly first cousins are permitted to 
marry because they can’t produce children; homosexuals are 
forbidden to marry because they can’t produce children.”99 But 
surely, the focus in the case of homosexual couples is whether they 
are appropriate candidates for adoption in the first place. Would the 
state laws permit these sexagenarians to be adoptive parents? If not, 
it is not their reproductive status that is at issue but their 
inappropriateness as adoptive parents. That is the question that must 
be asked of the homosexual couple, which would require detailed 
sociological analysis. While single-sex upbringing is a fact of life in, 
say, the case of aunts or uncles or other relatives that may be charged 
with the upbringing of a child, they are exceptional and should not 
be legislated as the default position. 
In fairness to Judge Posner, the question put by the court to 
Indiana’s counsel “you agree same-sex couples can successfully raise 
children, why shouldn’t the ban be lifted as to them?” did not 
receive the most persuasive of responses.100 It gave rise to derision in 
the reasons.101 This derision could have been avoided if the response 
had been that the State’s policy was based upon the most credible 
evidence available as to the durability of homosexual relationships 
and the outcomes for children that have reached adulthood in 
relationships other than with their biological parents. If Indiana had 
taken this approach, the court would have had much less capacity to 
deride, particularly if that evidence were, as it should have been, the 
subject of submissions. That would surely have gone some distance 
to satisfying the test laid down in United States v. Virginia and 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan that there was an 
important governmental objective substantially related to the 
discriminatory means used to achieve it.102 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Baskin, 766 F.3d at 662. The lawyer responded by saying, “the assumption is that 
with opposite-sex couples there is very little thought given during the sexual act, sometimes, to 
whether babies may be a consequence.” Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
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2. The genetic argument 
Second, Judge Posner concludes that homosexual orientation is 
genetic, an immutable and innate characteristic. To support this, his 
Honor cites a 2008 brochure from the American Psychological 
Association and scholarly articles in much the way that a court might 
refer to academic opinion on a point of economic theory.103 But the 
outcome here is not a question of whether corporate behavior 
contravenes a statute but rather whether a constitutional principle 
should be invoked to invalidate state legislation with the effect of 
changing the long established social and legal institution of 
marriage—a matter, it might be suggested, that requires somewhat 
more certainty than contestable academic opinion. No other 
evidence seems to have been made available to the court on this 
point. And on this basis, his Honor concludes as a fact the genetic 
origins of the proclivity. However, it seems well-known that contrary 
opinions hold that no genetic cause has yet been identified; 
homosexuality’s origin is still an open question. 
There is, for instance, also the contrary argument that if 
homosexuality was genetic, it should have disappeared according to 
evolutionary theory: homosexuals do not produce offspring.104 Judge 
Posner acknowledges that this is a problem, but says that the “kin 
selection hypothesis,” also known as “inclusive fitness theory,”105 
shows that homosexuality is compatible with evolutionary theory.106 
What Judge Posner fails to refer to is that the kin selection 
hypothesis or inclusive fitness theory is controversial and has been 
severely criticized by scientists, including the Harvard evolutionary 
biologist who first popularized the theory, Edward Wilson: 
Inclusive fitness theory is not a simplification over the standard 
approach. It is an alternative accounting method, but one that 
works only in a very limited domain. Whenever inclusive fitness 
does work, the results are identical to those of the standard 
 
 103.  See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 657–58, 666–68 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied 
sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 104.  See id. 
105.   See id.; William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of altruistic behavior, 1963 AM. NAT. 
97, 354–56. 
 106.  See id. at 657–58. 
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approach. Inclusive fitness theory is an unnecessary detour, which 
does not provide additional insight or information.107 
The genetic origin of homosexuality is unsettled and contestable. 
This presents what appears to be a fundamental flaw in this part of 
the opinion. The case illustrates that the Court was hardly the right 
venue for the resolution of issues of strongly contested evolutionary 
theory in order to effect constitutional and social change.  
3. No harm to society or the institution of marriage 
Third, comes the reasoning that same-sex marriage does no harm 
to the institution of marriage or to society at large. This is an 
assertion that may be impossible to prove in less than two 
generations. Judge Posner seems quite impressed by a recent study 
which analyzed whether marriage rates fell after Massachusetts 
permitted same-sex marriage. “[A]llowing same-sex marriage has no 
effect on the heterosexual marriage rate,”108 he concludes. But this is 
not to the point. How could a snapshot of Massachusetts marriages 
from 2004 to 2010 be expected to say anything worthwhile about 
the effect upon an international and centuries-old institution? And, 
as has already been mentioned, his Honor’s treatment of the 
implications for children seems superficial and poorly reasoned in 
the extreme.109 
4. Benefits to children 
Fourth, Judge Posner confirms that the welfare of children 
should be at the front and center of arguments about marriage.110 
Since marriage is the best place to raise children, he argues, it is 
discriminatory to deny homosexual couples the right to raise their 
children within the framework of marriage.111 
But he only considers the material benefits of a hefty household 
income and the psychological comforts of having one’s parents be 
 
 107.  Martin A. Nowak, Corina E. Tarnita, & Edward O. Wilson, The Evolution of 
Eusociality, 466 NATURE 1057, 1059 (2010). 
   108.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 668 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub 
nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 109.  See supra text accompanying notes 95–96. 
   110.  Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663. 
 111.  See id. 
ROCHOW.FINROCHOW.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2016  4:13 PM 
609  An Incurable Malaise 
 637 
married.112 The real question that should have been addressed is 
whether a marriage with a mother and a father is the best place to 
raise children. Judge Posner ignores almost completely the 
psychological effects on children of growing up in a homosexual 
marriage, focused as he is on the rights of adults. It is these effects, 
as well as others, that this paper will now address. 
V. TYPES OF EVIDENTIARY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
OVERLOOKED IN BASKIN 
It is not just the way in which the court in Baskin dealt with the 
evidence and arguments that were before it or that it assimilated into 
its reasons that is troubling. Rather, it is what was not considered in 
the reasons that is particularly alarming. It is a demonstration that 
the curial process is not well suited to the type of policy 
considerations and judicial activism on which the court embarked. 
In the case of Baskin, the burden on the State should have been 
relatively light given the conjectural nature of the support for the 
same-sex side of the argument. And so, at some stage in the process, 
it must fall to the complainant to show that there is not only a 
deficiency in the evidence adduced by the State in showing its 
reasonableness in so discriminating, but also that there is good 
reason why the court should not discriminate. Just how strong is the 
justification for same-sex marriage? A logical answer to that question 
seems to be missing from Baskin. Yet, it is not at all self-evident. 
There were many stronger arguments that needed consideration 
other than this strawman. What follows are examples of the types of 
arguments and evidence that a thoroughgoing consideration would 
be likely to take into account. It starts with the statistical advantages 
of marriage. It then moves to the benefits to children of a stable 
marriage between their biological parents. It finishes with the 
statistical disadvantages of parenting outside of traditional marriage. 
A. Statistical Advantages of Heterosexual Marriage 
There is one matter on which Judge Posner is correct, despite his 
failure to cite supporting evidence: marriage is a “socially beneficial 
 
   112.  Baskin, 766 F.3d at 664. 
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institution.”113 However, his Honor overlooked the fact that the vast 
bulk of the statistical evidence gathered has been about heterosexual 
marriage and the evidence regarding the comparability of 
homosexual marriage is either too new or longitudinally insufficient 
to compare the outcomes for both types of relationship. Some of the 
evident benefits of heterosexual marriage are outlined below:114 
• Married people are more productive, have higher incomes, 
and enjoy more family time than the unmarried due to the 
division of specialization of labor.115  
• Married men earn between 10% and 40% more than similarly 
situated unmarried men.116  
• Married mothers are less likely to live in poverty.117  
• Children are less likely, statistically, to live in poverty if they 
are raised by biological parents whose marriage endures.118 
• Married men and women lead healthier lives than 
the unmarried.119  
• Married women more often have access to health 
insurance.120 
• Divorced and widowed men and women are more likely to 
get into arguments and fights and to do dangerous things.121 
• Married couples lead more ordered lives, with healthier 
eating and sleeping habits and take fewer chances that could 
cause accidents.122  
 
   113. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub 
nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); see also William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership 
Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961, 991 n.185. See also 
the contrasting evidence arising from other studies discussed below at the text accompanying 
notes 153 and following. 
 114. For a general bibliography, see Why Marriage Matters: Economic Impact, FOR YOUR 
MARRIAGE, http://www.foryourmarriage.org/economic-impact/ (last visited March 13, 
2015), at which each of the works cited are referenced. 
 115.  Id. 
 116. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA WHITEHEAD, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 
16 (2005). 
 117. WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: 10 PRINCIPLES 
20 (2006). 
 118.  INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: 26 CONCLUSIONS 
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 19 (2005). 
 119.  KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 30 (2012) (discussing drinking, substance abuse, 
drinking and driving and generally living dangerously among single men). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
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• Marriage improves both men’s and women’s 
psychological well-being.123  
• Married men and women have statistically longer lives than 
the unmarried.124 
• Married men and women statistically have lower rates of 
contracting cancer and it seems that marriage offers a better 
chance of survival in the event of diagnosis.125 
• Those who are married have statistically lower incidents of 
premature deaths from cardiovascular disease, hypertension, 
pneumonia, and stroke.126 
• The married have statistically fewer mental problems and 
tend to smoke and drink much less than separated or 
divorced men and women.127 
• Marital status has a stronger correlation with age at death 
than socioeconomic status for most major causes.128 
The research does seem unanimous to the effect that marrying 
and remaining married bring better health outcomes than any other 
form of lifestyle. The research also seems to be unanimous across 
jurisdictional boundaries, whether in the United States, Britain, 
Canada, or Australia.129 
In relation to a survey of almost 40,000 Australians to which 
Kevin Andrews refers,130 researcher Jonathan Kelley observes, “It 
isn’t just that happier people marry but when we follow single 
people over time, we find their happiness is actually boosted by 
marriage.”131 Of course, Andrews and Kelley are both referring to 
longitudinal studies of heterosexual marriage. The evidence so far 
available on homosexual relationships is discussed in the section 
“How same-sex relationships compare” below.132 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 30 (2012). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
  128.  Id. 
 129.  KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 31–32 (2012). 
 130.  Id. 
      131.   Id. 
132.   See infra Part V.C.2. 
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B. The Benefits of Stable Marriage between Biological 
Parents for Children 
The evidence not only indicates that marriage favors the 
wellbeing of adults, but, even more importantly, enhances in marked 
ways the happiness, health, and adjustment of children. Children 
who are raised by their two biological parents within a stable 
marriage enjoy significant advantages. Whether it be in terms of 
better health,133 enjoyment of subsequent adult relationships,134 or 
educational outcomes,135 children from stable marriages are 
significantly better off. With respect to the research on educational 
outcomes, Andrews observes: 
Families are one of the strongest influences on the growth of 
human confidence, mental and emotional wellbeing and physical 
health. Four decades ago, the Coleman report identified the family 
rather than the school as the major determinant of learning 
outcomes for children. The results have been replicated many 
times. Children of Indochinese refugees, who had missed months, 
even years of schooling, and had lived in relocation camps, with 
scant exposure to western culture and little knowledge of the 
English language, were found to achieve remarkable success. The 
stunning success was not found in the schools that they had 
originally come from or to which they subsequently attended, but 
attributable to their family environment. This is just one illustration 
of the powerful impact of stable marriage and family life on 
educational outcomes for children. 
Children who grow up in an intact family achieve higher school 
scores, report significantly less school-related behavioural problems 
and higher aspirations for tertiary studies. They also receive greater 
parental nurturance, mentoring and advising.136 
C. Statistical Disadvantages of Parenting Outside of 
Traditional Marriage 
What is also absent from the reasoning in Baskin is whether 
relationships other than traditional marriage can be beneficial to 
 
 133.  Id. beginning at 55. 
 134.  Id. at 66–67. 
 135.  Id. at 67–68. 
 136.  KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO”  67 (2012). 
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children. This is again a serious oversight in the reasoning of the 
case. It is clear, from the above examples, which reflect only a small 
fraction of the research that has been done, that stable marriage 
between biological parents is the best predictor of good outcomes 
for adults and children and a net contributor to social stability. 
This section shows this through a few different sets of statistics. 
First, it will address the social and economic costs of divorce and 
family breakdown. Second, it will move to a comparison of 
heterosexual and homosexual parenting by looking at two things: 1) 
the uncertain or inconclusive findings on the potentially negative 
impact on children of same-sex parents and 2) the difference in 
divorce rates between heterosexual and homosexual parents. 
1. The social and economic costs of divorce and family breakdown 
In a recent article, social commentator Bettina Arndt cited a 
British High Court Judge, Sir Paul Coleridge, who observed that 
“couples” shouldn’t have children if their relationship is not stable 
enough to merit getting married.137 Speaking shortly before his 
retirement after a distinguished career in family law, the Judge 
challenged the common notion that it makes no difference whether 
parents cohabit or marry. “One [arrangement] tends to last and the 
other doesn’t. . . . [C]hildren with unmarried parents were twice as 
likely to suffer a family break-up as those with married parents. The 
proportion of children born to unmarried parents in Britain reached 
a record 47.5 per cent [in 2012].”138  
Referring to a Brookings Institution report, Arndt goes on to 
make the following observations: 
The result, according to the report, is a growing social divide, with 
well-educated people still tending to marry and then have children, 
while lower socio-economic groups are more likely to have children 
in de facto relationships. These children often end up in single-
parent families. This emerging difference in marriage patterns is 
 
 137. Bettina Arndt, The Unspoken Truth About Marriage and Kids, THE AGE (Dec., 16, 
2013, available at http://www.theage.com.au/comment/the-unspoken-truth-about-
marriage-and-kids-20131215-2zf3f.html. 
 138.  Id. (quoting Sir Paul Coleridge, British High Court Judge who was citing Marriage 
Foundation research). 
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adding to the gap between the haves and the have-nots, increasing 
social disadvantage. 
Of course there are de facto couples with lasting relationships and 
thriving children, but the broader patterns tell a different story – 
just as the 90-year-old who smokes has no bearing on the link 
between cigarettes and health risks. . . 
The media is part of the problem, given in their number are more 
than a fair share of cohabiting couples. . . . 
Public discussion of this important social trend is discouraged by 
media players who won’t acknowledge that their preferred lifestyle 
choices have very different consequences on the other side of the 
social divide – yet the impact on kids of the casualisation of family 
relations is no laughing matter.139 
Millions of children are victims of adult selfishness. These 
phenomena are also indelibly etched into our national psyche and 
form part of our history that brings us shame. And it is as if the 
national disgrace of children being the victims of divorce were not 
enough. We have also in our recent history an acknowledgement of 
the “Stolen Generation” of Aboriginal children taken from their 
biological mothers in the 1940s and 1950s to be raised in Caucasian 
families.140 There have also been Royal Commissions into this and 
other abuses of children in both publicly funded141 and religiously 
organized institutions.142 As a nation, Australia should certainly pause 
before racing headlong into any other change in social policy that 
would impact upon children, as marriage necessarily does. And a 
court such as that presided over by Judge Posner ought to have done 
the same. 
 
 139.  Id. (citing Brookings Institution, Knot Yet: The Future of Marriage in the U.S., 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/3/20-knot-yet-marriage/ 
20130320_knot_yet_marriage_transcript.pdf). 
 140.  See Australian Human Rights Commission, Bringing them home: The ‘Stolen 
Children’ Report (1997), available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/aboriginal-
and-torres-strait-islander-social-justice/publications/bringing-them-home-stolen. 
 141. Mullighan Inquiry, GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.sa.gov.au/topics/crime-justice-and-the-law/mullighan-inquiry (concerning 
public institutional abuse). 
 142. ROYAL COMMISSION INTO INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO CHILD SEX ABUSE, 142 , 
available at http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/ (last visited March 14, 2015). 
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Despite these glaring warnings of how society can systemically 
fail innocent children with alarming indifference, one is compelled to 
ask whether the lesson has yet been properly learned. Some social 
trends still move alarmingly towards the denial of the child’s ability 
to identify with and live with their biological parents. Two of the 
foremost scholars on family, Wilcox and Marquardt, have recently 
expressed the social trend in these terms: 
Throughout history, marriage has first and foremost been an 
institution for procreation and raising children. It has provided the 
cultural tie that seeks to connect the father to his children by 
binding him to the mother of his children. Yet in recent times, 
children have been increasingly pushed from center stage.143 
One of America’s most prominent legal scholars and social 
commentators, Professor Mary Ann Glendon, described the current 
law and attitude towards marriage and divorce in these terms: 
The [current] American story about marriage, as told in the law 
and in much popular literature, goes something like this: marriage 
is a relationship that exists primarily for the fulfilment of the 
individual spouses. If it ceases to perform this function, no one is 
to blame and either spouse may terminate it at will. . . . Children 
hardly appear in the story; at most they are rather shadowy 
characters in the background.144 
And former University of Chicago Law School professor, 
Brigham Young University president, Utah State Supreme Court 
Justice, and current international religious leader, Dallin Oaks, 
observed as follows:145 
There are surely cases when a divorce is necessary for the good of 
the children but those circumstances are exceptional. In most 
marital contests the contending parents should give much greater 
weight to the interests of the children. . . . Children need the 
emotional and personal strength that come from being raised by 
 
 143. THE NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN 
AMERICA 82 (2011). 
 144. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN 
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 108 (1987). 
 145. Dallin H. Oaks, Protect the Children, ENSIGN, Nov. 2012, audio and visual 
recordings available at https://www.lds.org/general-conference/2012/10/protect-the-
children?lang=eng. 
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two parents who are united in their marriage and their goals. As 
one who was raised by a widowed mother, I know first hand that 
this cannot always be achieved, but it is the ideal to be sought 
whenever possible. 
Children are the first victims of the current laws permitting so-
called “no-fault divorce.” From the standpoint of children, divorce 
is too easy. Summarizing decades of social science research, a 
careful scholar concluded that “the family structure that produces 
the best outcomes for children, on average, are two biological 
parents who remain married.”146 A New York Times writer noted, 
“the striking fact that even as traditional marriage has declined in 
the United States . . . the evidence has mounted for the 
institution’s importance to the wellbeing of children.”147 That 
reality should give important guidance to parents and parents-to-be 
in their decisions involving marriage and divorce. We also need 
politicians, policymakers, and officials to increase their attention to 
what is best for children in contrast to the selfish interests of voters 
and vocal advocates of adult interests. . . . We should assume the 
same disadvantages for children raised by couples of the same 
gender. The social science literature is controversial and politically 
charged on the long-term effect of this on children, principally 
because, as the New York Times writer observed, “same-sex 
marriage is a social experiment, and like most social experiments it 
will take time to understand its consequences.”148 
The reasoning of Judge Posner on behalf of the court falters not 
only by the logical omission of the above considerations, but if all of 
the available evidence were carefully considered, the result should 
have been the other way. That evidence shows that children whose 
biological parents have always been married enjoy higher grades at 
school, greater educational achievements, and live longer and 
happier lives with a better chance for success in their own marriages 
when they reach adulthood.149 The opposite occurs when they are 
 
 146. Id. (quoting CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 
1960-2010, at 158 (2012)). 
 147. Id. (quoting Ross Douthat, Gay Parents and the Marriage Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2012, http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/gay-parents-and-the-
marriage-debate). 
 148. Id. 
 149.  See supra text accompanying note 144. 
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subjected to the turmoil of divorce and relationship breakdown.150 It 
is the children who are clearly the major casualties of the poor 
personal and social choices made by those who care for them. 
Marriage is, on the evidence, the optimal circumstance in which they 
should be raised. Heterosexual nuclear family marriage is capable of 
being put up successfully against any other form of social experiment 
on how the family should be arranged. 
The other side of the marriage equation that has to be evaluated 
is the cost of divorce. Whereas a stable marriage is a net contributor 
to society as well as the wellbeing of all of the members of the family 
that is based upon that marriage,151 divorce is a net cost to the 
community. A recent Newscorp analysis of information from the 
Australian Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of 
Human Services has shown that the financial cost of divorce annually 
is a huge one.152 Each Australian taxpayer now pays about $1,100.00 
per year to support families in crisis. The figures that were analyzed 
in respect of the current financial year show that “the government 
will spend $12.5 billion on support payments to single parents, 
including tax benefits and rent assistance. Another $1.5 billion will 
be spent on the administration of the child support system, while the 
cost to taxpayers from family disputes in Australian courts is $202 
million [each year].”153 
The results of one of those studies conducted by Judith 
Wallerstein, who started interviewing a group of 131 children in 
1975 are compelling.154 These were children whose parents were all 
going through a divorce.155 Wallerstein asked the children to tell her 
about the intimate details of their lives, which they did with 
remarkable candor. What was unique about the published study was 
that the researcher, Wallerstein, stayed in contact with the group of 
131 children, along with a control group of children who were in 
 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152. Lauren Wilson & Lisa Cornish, Divorce Is Costing The Australian Economy $14 
Billion A Year, NEWS.COM.AU (July 5, 2014, 10:52 PM), 
http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/relationships/divorce-is-costing-the-australian-economy-
14-billion-a-year/story-fnet09y4-1226979027353.  
 153.  Id. 
 154.  JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE 
UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY xix (2001). 
 155.  Id. 
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stable families, for a quarter of a century. One social commentator 
cited the following passage from the authors in a review: 
From the viewpoint of children, and counter to what happens to 
their parents, divorce is a cumulative experience. Its impact 
increases over time and rises to a crescendo in adulthood. At each 
developmental stage divorce is experienced anew in different ways. 
In adulthood it affects personality, the ability to trust, expectations 
about relationships, and ability to cope with change. . . . But it’s in 
adulthood that children of divorce suffer the most. The impact of 
divorce hits them most cruelly as they go in search of love, sexual 
intimacy, and commitment. Their lack of inner images of a man 
and woman in a stable relationship and their memories of their 
parents’ failure to sustain the marriage badly hobbles their search, 
leading them to heartbreak and even despair. . . . [C]hildren of 
divorce and those in happy intact families live in separate albeit 
parallel universes. . . . What about the children? In our rush to 
improve the lives of adults, we assumed that their lives would 
improve as well. We made radical changes in the family without 
realizing how it would change the experience of growing up. We 
embarked on a gigantic social experiment without any idea about 
how the next generation would be affected.156 
Social science is teaching us that marriage alone cannot be the 
best of outcomes. It must be a stable marriage of a couple of 
opposite sex. Furthermore, policy needs to encourage that outcome. 
This is precisely what history and common sense should have told us 
already. Social and economic costs and loss of social capital are 
bound up with failure to encourage stable marriage. The evidence 
behooves all legislators and policymakers to do all they can to 
preserve the institution of stable marriage between biological 
parents. Recognizing that departures from this ideal will, from time 
to time, arise or become necessary, legislators should not, on the 
evidence, lightly depart from marriage. 
A court charged with a decision as important as that in Baskin 
needs to look to what will produce the best outcomes for the next 
generation. This raises a couple of questions. Is experimentation with 
 
 156. Bill Muehlenberg, A Review of The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce by Judith 
Wallerstein, CULTURE WATCH, http://billmuehlenberg.com/2000/09/15/a-review-of-the-
unexpected-legacy-of-divorce-by-judith-wallerstein/ (last visited March 10, 2015) (quoting 
WALLERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 298–99, 22, xxviii). 
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other forms of parenting justified and can society afford the 
potential costs? 
2. How same-sex relationships compare 
No comparison was undertaken by the Court in Baskin between 
the relative social benefits of heterosexual marriage and homosexual 
marriage, possibly because the evidence is scant. But such evidence as 
there is places a heavy persuasive burden upon the supporters of 
same-sex marriage that has not been discharged.157 
In fact, one of the constant refrains used by same-sex marriage 
supporters is that there is nothing to fear because nothing will really 
change if same-sex marriage becomes legal in Australia.158 This seems 
counterintuitive and is contrary to the evidence available from 
overseas in critical areas of social concern. Specifically, same-sex 
parents have potentially negative effects upon their children a) in 
general and b) through a higher rate of divorce than for heterosexual 
marriages.159 In short, the claims of no change or even of only 
minimal change are untrue. 
a. Same-sex parenting. Studies looking at the effects of same-sex 
parents on their children have not conclusively shown that this form 
of parenting is the same as or better than heterosexual parenting. 
While there are studies suggesting findings in favor of same-sex 
parents, those studies have many weaknesses that make it nearly 
impossible to safely rely on their findings. There is at least enough 
uncertainty as to the benefits to the child for one to take care and 
time in promoting same-sex parenting as an acceptable social 
institution. This section will focus on an Australian study and detail 
its problems with methodology, contradictions, and ethics. 
There is an overall problem with any sociological evidence that is 
examined in relation to same-sex parenting. Neither side of the 
debate can claim to have had sufficient time for the experiment of 
 
 157.  See supra text accompanying notes 124–43. 
 158.  David Penberthy, Nothing to Fear About Gay Marriage, THE ADVERTISER 
(Adelaide, Austl.) (Apr. 20, 2013, 11:30 PM), 
http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/opinion/david-penberthy-nothing-to-fear-about-gay-
marriage/story-e6freabc-1226625060309. 
 159.  This section does not discuss other harms to the society from losses of freedoms of 
speech, conscience, and religion. 
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same-sex parenting to be rigorously tested with sufficient data over 
time and large sample sizes. However, those studies that have been 
undertaken cannot be interpreted as auguring well. In fact, one of 
the latest and most thorough studies finds significant disadvantages 
reported by young adults with a parent who had same-sex 
relationships prior to the child’s turning eighteen.160 With stains on 
our nation’s history pages in actions taken at the expense of children 
(such as the Stolen Generation and other instances of institutional 
child abuse as referred to above) these findings should not be 
ignored or rejected out of hand. Yet, that seems to be precisely what 
is being advocated by a number of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and 
transgender (LGBT) activists and their sympathizers.161 
Studies in this area produce a great deal of controversy.162 There 
is an obvious temptation to exaggerate the benefits. It is also 
tempting, possibly, to jump the gun on proper research 
methodology. One of the current controversies relates to the most 
recent Australian study done on child health in same-sex families, 
most of which coverage has been positive: The Australian Study of 
Child Health in Same-Sex Families or ACHESS.163 ACHESS had “a 
convenience sample of 390 parents from Australia who self-identified 
as same-sex attracted and had children aged 0-17 years. Parent-
reported, multidimensional measures of child health and wellbeing 
and the relationship to perceived stigma were measured.”164 The self-
identified volunteers for the study—some 315 parents—represented 
500 children, eighty percent of them with female index parent and 
eighteen percent with a male index parent.165 
 
 160. See Mark Regnerus, How Different Are Adult Children of Parents Who Have 
Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures, 41 SOC. SCI. RESEARCH 
752 (2012). 
 161.  See supra notes 136–37. See also Ilana Yurkiewicz, Why Mark Regnerus Study 
Shouldn’t Matter, Even if it Were the Most Scientifically Robust Study in the World, SCIENTIFIC 
AM. BLOG (Jun. 16, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/unofficial-prognosis/why-
mark-regnerus-study-shouldnt-matter-even-if-it-were-the-most-scientifically-robust-study-in-
the-world/. 
 162.  See supra text accompanying notes 174–75. 
 163. Simon R. Crouch et al., Parent-Reported Measures of Child Health and Wellbeing in 
Same-Sex Parent Families: A Cross-Sectional Survey, BMC PUB. HEALTH 14:635 (June 21, 
2014), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/14/635/abstract. 
 164. Id. at 1.  
 165. Id. at 6. 
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One critic observed the reaction to the study’s findings: 
The latest “research” about same-sex parenting was published in 
Australia to considerable fanfare because it “found” that children’s 
well-being with homosexual parents was as good or better than 
with heterosexual parents. Any problems faced by the children were 
attributed to the “stigma” associated with homosexual parenting. 
The lead author, Simon Crouch, claimed in the Conversation, “It is 
liberating for parents to take on roles that suit their skills rather 
than defaulting to gender stereotypes, where mum is the primary 
caregiver and dad the primary breadwinner. Our research suggests 
that abandoning such gender stereotypes might be beneficial to 
child health.”166 
 But ACHESS is the subject of serious criticism on a number of 
methodological bases.167 The popular press coverage has not 
disclosed serious methodological weaknesses in ACHESS, as pointed 
out by Mark Regnerus168 and by Janice Crouse (author of Children 
at Risk169 and executive director and senior fellow at Concerned 
Women for America’s Beverly La Haye Institute).170 
 The first weakness is that the study uses self-registration rather 
than random sampling. Regnerus cites the following in the 
methodology section: “The convenience sample was recruited using 
online and traditional recruitment techniques, accessing same-sex 
attracted parents through news media, community events and 
community groups. Three hundred and ninety eligible parents 
contacted the researchers . . . .”171 Regnerus then points to the 
sampling distortion and bias inherent in the methodology leading to 
the conclusion by referring to the sampling approach announced two 
years before the study was completed: 
 
 166. Janice Shaw Crouse, What About That Australian Study About Same-Sex Parenting?, 
THE AM. SPECTATOR (July 18, 2014), http://spectator.org/articles/60001/what-about-
australian-study-about-same-sex-parenting. 
 167. See infra text accompanying notes 183–85. 
 168. Mark Regnerus, Is Same-Sex Parenting Better for Kids? The New Australian Study 
Can’t Tell Us, THE WITHERSPOON INST. (July 9, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com 
/2014/07/13451/. 
 169.  JANICE SHAW CROUSE, CHILDREN AT RISK: THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF 
CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING IN AMERICA (2010). 
 170.  Crouse, supra note 166. 
 171.  Regnerus, supra note 168. 
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“Initial recruitment will . . . include advertisements and media 
releases in the gay and lesbian press, flyers at gay and lesbian social 
and support groups, and investigator attendance at gay and lesbian 
community events . . . . Primarily recruitment will be through 
emails posted on gay and lesbian community email lists aimed at 
same-sex parenting. This will include but not be limited to, Gay 
Dads Australia and the Rainbow Families Council of Victoria.”172 
There are two major problems with this approach for sampling. 
First, the criticism that Regnerus levels at this methodology is that it 
does not produce a study of average same-sex households with 
children.173 He says that to compare the results of this study with 
that of any “population-based sample of everyone else is . . . suspect 
science.”174 As a further explanation, Crouse notes that  
[Crouch] admits that convenience samples “are fraught with 
problems” . . . and notes that the parents’ level of education is 
skewed to higher education—73 percent have at least an 
undergraduate degree, with nearly half (46 percent) holding 
graduate degrees. Income level, too, is skewed, with 81 percent 
earning at least $60,000 and more than a quarter earning more 
than $100,000, nearly 20 percent earning $150,000 to $249,999, 
and 14 percent earning $250,000 plus.175  
 On this point, Crouse observes that Crouch “notes the 
significance of the differences in education and income; both he and 
others note that having more lesbian index parents and a shortage of 
male ones also significantly skews the data.”176 
Second, all of the participants in the study were well aware of the 
political import of the study topic and an unknown number of the 
participants signed up for that very reason.177 In Crouse’s special 
report, she comments that its credibility is impaired by the fact that 
it is the gay parents who are giving themselves good ratings.178 As she 
points out:  
 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Crouse, supra note 166 (quoting Crouch, supra note 163). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
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Homosexual activists have been jubilant and have engaged in a 
public relations campaign, conveniently blurring the lines between 
fact and fiction. For instance, the activists imply that children 
actually participated when, in fact, the parents answered for the 
children and the children had no involvement in the responses. 
Further, any stigma reported was perceived by the parents as well. 
Is anyone surprised that the homosexual parents reported that their 
children are happier and healthier than children in 
heterosexual families?179 
She goes on to note that:  
The authors advertised in homosexual publications and on websites 
to get participants; it was not a random sample. The study 
participants knew before going into the study that its purpose was 
to make homosexual parenting look successful. All of these factors 
made it difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess the 
study’s findings.180 
Regnerus similarly argues that it would be unwise to trust such 
self-reports.181 This is particularly true “given the high risk of ‘social 
desirability bias,’ or the tendency to portray oneself (or here, one’s 
children) as better than they actually are.”182 The temptation to 
report positive assessments is just unavoidable in this self-selected 
sample on a sensitive and politically charged topic.  
Crouse concludes on self-selection by making points that 
discredit ACHESS for use in the purposes to which proponents of 
same-sex marriage would wish to put it. 
It is significant to note that the author admits (even though his fans 
angrily attack critics who make similar observations), “The self-
selection of our convenience sample has the potential to introduce 
bias that could distort results.” Amazingly, Crouch also caveats his 
final conclusion; he summarized, “It is clear that there are aspects 
at play in our sample of same-sex families that allow improved 
outcomes in general behavior, general health, and in particular 
family cohesion.” Crouch admits that while “there is no evidence 
to suggest that any group of parents would systematically respond 
 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Regnerus, supra note 168. 
 182.  Id. 
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in a particular way on any given scale,” such a conclusion “cannot 
be discounted entirely.” He recommends that further research be 
based on reports from the children, “as well as contextual analysis 
of qualitative data drawn from family interviews” with a goal of 
eliminating “any bias that parental reporting might have.” Crouch 
concludes his study by expressing appreciation for a father in Gay 
Dads of Australia for his “guidance on community engagement” 
during the study.183 
The criticisms that Regnerus does make in relation to ACHESS’ 
sampling methods are similar to those that he makes of the United 
States National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study (NLLFS).184 In 
the case of the NLLFS, Regnerus says that, again, the participants 
were well aware of the political import of the study topic and that 
the bias within sample is therefore impossible to discern, creating an 
impossible flaw in the research.185 
Because of these major flaws, Regnerus did his own research that 
avoided this major sampling problem: 
Skepticism about the . . . sample is all the more reason to do a 
random study that doesn’t advertise its intentions beforehand. 
That’s exactly why the survey I oversaw, the New Family Structures 
Study (NFSS), elected to talk to the children after they had grown 
up, to skip the parents entirely to ensure a more independent 
assessment, not to broadcast our key research questions in the title 
or initial screener questionnaire, and to locate participants 
randomly in a large population-based sample. If you’ve been paying 
attention, however, you’ll know that my NFSS studies—which 
mapped 248 respondents who told us their mother or father had 
been in a same-sex relationship—came to rather different 
conclusions than the . . . study has.186 
In turn, and in fairness, it should be noted that the LGBT 
movement has produced its critics of Regnerus.187 And, indeed, if the 
ACHESS study’s conclusions are seriously to be relied upon it must 
be observed that same-sex partners produce outcomes for children 
 
 183.  Crouse, supra note 166. 
 184.  Regnerus, supra note 168. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See infra text accompanying note 191. 
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that are equal to or better than those for heterosexual couples.188 
This should not be heralded as a triumph for proponents of same-sex 
marriage. Rather, if its validity is not to be doubted, the claim as a 
justification for same-sex marriage would be far too modest. Instead, 
it would surely mark the more desirable way to rear children.189 But 
it is not. While this is not a criticism that Regnerus makes, it follows 
from the LGBT claims.190 
Among the critics of Regnerus and his methodology is Nathaniel 
Frank, author of Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the 
Military and Weakens America.191 Frank is a leading advocate for gay 
parenting who came into prominence for his advocacy in favor of 
including openly gay recruits in the military.192 Frank, though a 
historian rather than a sociologist, has criticized Regnerus for what 
he asserts is Regnerus’ flawed sociological methodology.193 It may be 
that Frank is somewhat sensitive about the methodology that he is 
employing in his own research project What We Know, because the 
website that displays the research simultaneously announces its bias: 
The first phase focuses on research on LGBT equality, specifically 
gay parenting and marriage, youth challenges, and physical and 
mental health issues. Future phases may include additional policy 
issues such as economic growth, gun safety, education reform and 
possibly climate change, among others. The goal is to shape public 
policy in a “long game” that uses research-based messages to 
 
 188.  Univ. of Melbourne, AUSTL. STUDY OF CHILD HEALTH IN SAME-SEX FAMILIES, 
http://www.achess.org.au/ (last visited March 10, 2015) . 
 189.  The conclusion asserts: “Australian children with same-sex attracted parents score 
higher than population samples on a number of parent-reported measures of child health. 
Perceived stigma is negatively associated with mental health. Through improved awareness of 
stigma these findings play an important role in health policy, improving child health 
outcomes.” Crouch, supra note 163. 
 190.  Univ. of Melbourne, supra note 188. 
 191.  NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES THE 
MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA (2009). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Nathaniel Frank, The Shamelessness of Professor Mark Regnerus, SLATE BLOG: 
OUTWARD (Mar. 4, 2014, 5:30 PM),  http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/ 
03/04/mark_regnerus_testifies_in_michigan_same_sex_marriage_case_his_study_is.html. 
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influence public opinion, law, and quality of life, particularly for 
vulnerable populations.194 
 It could hardly be suggested either that Frank is dispassionate or 
that his research is undertaken without foreordained conclusions and 
policy objectives in mind. And while some of Crouse’s trenchant 
criticisms of the ACHESS flaws are similar to those made by 
Regnerus, they are not as readily dismissed by Frank’s tit-for-tat style 
response to Regnerus by pointing to his methodology rather than 
answering the questions raised about ACHESS. 
The second major problem with the ACHESS study is 
contradictions made by its author about whether children of same-
sex parents encounter and are harmed by stigmas. Crouse poses 
questions regarding the study’s methodology including 
contradictions that are not explained in the Crouch’s work: 
Ironically and in contradiction of his own research, in 2012 Crouch 
was promoting same-sex parenting by quoting “longitudinal 
research from the United Kingdom” that supposedly shows that 
children with lesbian mothers have “social acceptance, close 
friendships and peer relationships” that are “no different” from 
other families; he also suggested that studies from the United 
States showed that children with lesbian mothers “were more 
connected at school.” The contradictions continued in his 2014 
study when Crouch emphasized concerns “about the impact that 
stigma and discrimination could potentially have . . . in countries 
where there’s a lot of perceived stigma—most notably, the United 
States.” He went on to assert, “Children face definite challenges 
coping with homophobic attitudes.” (Yet, he claims, they suffer no 
ill effects!)195 
Crouse goes on to note that:  
Boston University Professor of Pediatrics Benjamin Siegel also 
claims that the gender and “sexual orientation” of parents is 
irrelevant to children’s well-being, saying that “many studies have 
demonstrated” that children are much more affected by the 
“relationships with their parents, their parents’ sense of 
 
 194.  Cindy Gao, Call for Interns for LGBT Research Project, COLUM. L. SCH.: GENDER 
& SEXUALITY BLOG (Jan. 2, 2014), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/ 
genderandsexualitylawblog/2014/01/02/call-for-interns-for-lgbt-research-project/. 
 195.  Crouse, supra note 166 (quoting Crouch, supra note 163) 
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competence and security, and the presence of social and economic 
support for the family than by the gender or the sexual orientation 
of their parents.”196 
But, as Crouse observes: 
Such statements raise the question: If homosexual parents in the 
Crouch study perceive a lot of stigma, how can their children have 
higher outcomes in some categories than children from 
heterosexual families? If the parents feel an overwhelming sense of 
stigma, and if they believe other people and the culture are 
stigmatizing their children, how can they report such a strong 
sense of security in their children?197 
Crouse then turns her attention to one of Crouch’s claims that 
“[c]hildren in same-sex parent families had higher scores on 
measures of general behaviour, general health and family cohesion 
compared to population normative data.”198 Further, Crouch found  
no significant differences between the two groups for all other scale 
scores. Physical activity, mental health, and family cohesion were all 
negatively associated with increased stigma and the presence of 
emotional symptoms was positively associated with increased 
stigma. . . . [Same-sex couples] construct their parenting roles 
more equitably than heterosexual parents.199 
 Crouse notes both the contradiction for the first part of the cited 
finding and the lack of evidence from Crouch or the ACHESS for 
the last assertion.200  
The third and final problem with the ACHESS study is an ethical 
issue. Crouse points to significant ethical concerns regarding the 
manner in which ACHESS was conducted.201 The children who are 
the subject of ACHESS may have been bought. The male index 
parents almost certainly engage in buying children. “In Australia, 
commercial surrogacy is illegal and altruistic surrogacy is not 
common; therefore, the children of male index parents (born 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. (quoting Crouch, supra note 163). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
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primarily in the United States and India) likely were purchased.”202 
While Crouse does not make the reference herself, this observation 
will raise the hackles of some opponents of same-sex marriage 
recalling the terrible Mark Newton international adoption pedophile 
case in which the victim, an adopted Asian child, had been purchased 
by the gay couple.203 
In short, those who favor same-sex marriage and same-sex 
parenting have yet to discharge the very heavy burden to 
demonstrate that there is no risk of harm to the children that will be 
raised in any such relationship if it were to become law in Australia. 
And certainly, it cannot be said, that they have discharged the 
burden to say that same-sex relationships would be an improvement 
on the current status quo. These are matters that are surely worthy 
of consideration by a court such as that in Baskin. Their absence 
from consideration is telling. 
b. Divorce in gay longitudinal studies. One matter that seems 
beyond controversy is that divorce has adverse effects upon the 
former couple’s children in areas such as health, education, and 
emotional wellbeing. For example, in Norway, Lyngstad and 
Engelhardt conducted a study which examined the influence of 
marital and divorce conduct of parents on subsequent generations, in 
relation to Norwegian first marriages between 1980 and 2003.204 
The study concluded that whether a couple remained married or 
divorced was repeatedly shown to be the importance to the marital 
stability of their children.205 In a yet further study, Dronkers and 
Harkonen studied the intergenerational transmission of divorce 
across eighteen countries and sought explanations in macro-level 
characteristics for the cross-national variation.206 They determined 
 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Nick Ralston, Named: The Australian Paedophile Jailed for 40 Years, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD: NAT’L, June 30, 2013, http://m.smh.com.au/national/named-the-
australian-paedophile-jailed-for-40-years-20130630-2p5da.html. 
 204.  Torkild Hovde Lyngstad & Henriette Engelhardt, The Influence of Offspring’s Sex 
and Age at Parents’ Divorce on the Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce, Norwegian First 
Marriages 1980–2003, 63 POPUL. STUD. 173, 173 (2009). 
 205.  Id. at 179. 
 206.  Jaap Dronkers & Juho Härkönen, The Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce in 
Cross-National Perspective: Results from the Fertility and Family Surveys, 62 POPUL. STUD. 
273, 273 (2008). 
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that women whose parents divorced had a significantly higher risk of 
divorce in seventeen countries.207 
Recently, the first lesbian couple to marry in New Zealand under 
its new same-sex marriage laws are now divorcing. This example 
raises the question of the statistical longevity of same-sex 
marriages.208 On this question, one would not expect that same-sex 
marriage would impact significantly upon the divorce rate of 50,000 
people per annum in Australia. The numbers of same-sex marriages 
are most likely to be low. As will be shown in this section, the 
evidence gathered from other jurisdictions is that the rate of divorce 
among homosexual couples is higher than among heterosexual 
couples. This has significance for children of homosexual unions. 
In neither Norway nor Sweden was there any legal recognition 
of same-sex “marriage” until 2009. Instead, in both countries, there 
was the ability for homosexual couples to register their relationships 
as civil unions. For the purposes of a recent demographical study, 
however, the registered partnerships in Norway and Sweden were 
treated as “same-sex marriages” to determine the rate of divorce. 
Andersson, Noack, Seierstad and Weedon-Fekjaer of the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research conducted the study into 
divorce risks when compared with the heterosexual population.209 
The study was based upon longitudinal information taken from 
population registers and looked at same-sex couples in a registered 
partnership.210 The data included a wide range of demographic 
integers: “age, sex, geographical background, experience of previous 
opposite-sex marriage, parenthood, and educational attainment of 
the parents involved.”211 Patterns emerged in the study showing that 
divorce risks are considerably higher in same-sex marriages. In the 
case of female same-sex partnerships, the divorce risk was found to 
be double that for male same-sex partnerships.212 
 
 207.  Id. at 285–86. 
 208.  Simon Collins, Same-Sex Marriage Pioneers Split, N.Z. HERALD (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11294678. 
 209.  Gunnar Andersson et al., The Demographics of Same-Sex Marriages in Norway and 
Sweden, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 79 (2006). 
 210.  Id. at 83–86. 
 211.  Id. at 79. 
 212.  Id. 
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The studies above (and the statistics that they disclose) do not 
provide any comfort that same-sex marriages statistically provide the 
most stable of environments into which to raise children. They show, 
at the very least, that on an objectively conducted longitudinal study 
with reliable publicly available data, that there is, statistically, at least 
a genuine risk to be addressed in the interests of children.213 
Viewed another way, the evidence reinforces the case that 
heterosexual marriage should be strengthened and its stability 
encouraged.214 Long pause and deep reflection are in order before 
legislators and policymakers move to import what appears to be, 
based on all of the international evidence, a defective product when 
it comes to same-sex marriage as either an alternative or an addition 
to the existing form of marriage as it is known in Australia. 
VI. LGBT ACTIVISM FOR AND AGAINST MARRIAGE 
Despite evidence against it, LGBT proponents have continued to 
fight for same-sex marriage. They have used various tactics and 
targeted specific groups on its way towards and following same-sex 
marriage. First, their history shows a conflict between joining and 
destroying the institution of marriage. Second, they have 
appropriated words to bolster support for their cause or to label 
opponents as bigots. Third, they have argued that same-sex marriage 
will not change the marriage institution, but examples show 
otherwise. Fourth, they have tried to force their will upon religious 
and conscientious individuals. Finally, they have made it appear as if 
same-sex marriage is inevitable. 
A. A Brief History of the Same-Sex Marriage Movement and its 
Internal Tensions 
When traced back through to its sources and as will be shown 
below, the pressure for legal recognition of relationships through 
same-sex marriage commenced in the 1970s in the United States. In 
the United States, equalities in treatment came very slowly. And so 
LGBT activists’ initial strategy in America was to seek legal 
 
 213.  See infra text accompanying notes 277 et seq. 
 214.  Id. 
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recognition or to destroy marriage. Klarman describes it in 
these terms: 
[M]ost gay activists in the early 1970s were not interested in 
marriage. In 1971, one activist wrote a detailed position paper for 
the ACLU in Washington State calling for the abolition of marriage 
“to protect individual freedom and the happiness which depends 
on it.” Lesbian feminists tended to want no part of marriage, which 
they regarded as an oppressive institution, given the traditional 
rules that defined it, such as coverture and immunity from rape. An 
early gay manifesto denounced traditional marriage as a “rotten, 
oppressive institution” that is “fraught with role playing.” 
Sex radicals tended to object to traditional marriage’s insistence on 
monogamy. To them, gay liberation meant sexual liberation. Much 
of the early gay press urged men to overcome their sexual shame 
and experiment with multiple partners. The queer politics of the 
1970s embraced slogans such as “Smash the Nuclear Family” and 
“Smash Monogamy.” Marriage did not comfortably fit into 
that picture. 
Yet some gays and lesbians plainly preferred committed, 
monogamous relationships and, if obtainable, marriage. . . . 
Other gay couples, seeking legal benefits of state-recognized 
relationships such as inheritance rights and medical decision-
making authority, turned to the practice of adult adoptions.215 
This pressure felt in the United States derived from legal 
imperatives that did not exist at the time in Australia. Their vestiges 
have long since been eroded. Now, the law in Australia places all 
homosexual and heterosexual relationships on the same financial 
footing both federally and in the states.216 
 
 215.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 22 (2013). 
 216.  For examples of the rights that have accrued to married persons that are also 
available to persons in a de facto relationship see: Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in 
Commonwealth Laws-General Law Reform) Act 2008 and the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal 
Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-Superannuation) Act 2008.; De Facto Relationships 
Act 1991 (NT); De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth); Property 
(Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW); Property 
Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vic); Succession Act 1981 (Qld); Local Government Act 1995 
(WA); and Maintenance Act 1967 (Tas). 
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From this brief history of the 1970s LGBT movement, it can be 
seen that Australia has never had much in common with the United 
States when it comes to the equal treatment of homosexual 
relationships for financial purposes before the law. Many of the most 
recent moves at the federal level in Australia have been in apparent 
recognition that although there was no need to re-define marriage, 
there was a need to provide equal certainty in all other areas.217 
The following are some of the common arguments against same-
sex marriage that have been advanced by opponents and rejected 
by supporters: 
1) It will weaken the institution of traditional marriage as 
a whole.218 
2) It will lead to demands for yet further reforms such as 
marriage for multi-party relationships or acceptance of 
underage marriage.219 
3) It will make gender roles and the position of mother and 
father superfluous.220 
4) It will threaten moral and religious freedom.221 
One of the difficulties over the years of campaigning for and 
against same-sex marriage has been that the arguments on both sides 
have been dismissed as just speculation.222 This is complicated by the 
fact that no one seems capable of announcing any unified LGBT 
goal on the subject of same-sex marriage.223 There has been a series 
of overlapping movements and those supporting same-sex marriage 
 
 217.  See infra text accompanying note 238. 
 218.  SHERIF GIRGIS, ET. AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 54–
56 (2012). 
 219.  Id. at 56–58. 
 220.  Id. at 58–62. 
 221.  Id. at 62–66. 
 222.  Dana Milbank, Speculation’s All That’s Left for Same-Sex Marriage Foes, 
HERALDNET (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20150422/ 
OPINION04/150429760; Joshua Bowman, Five Arguments For Gay Marriage, 
CATHOLICVOTE, http://www.catholicvote.org/five-arguments-for-gay-marriage (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2015).  
 223.  Evan Lenow, The Not-So-Unified Narrative of the LGBT Movement, COUNCIL ON 
BIBLICAL MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD  (June 4, 2015), http://cbmw.org/public-
square/essays-perspectives-the-not-so-unified-narrative-of-the-lgbt-movement/. 
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neither speak for all LGBT supporters, nor speak with any united 
voice on the motives of the respective movements.224 This has been 
so since the 70s; nothing has changed. Not all homosexuals seek 
same-sex marriage. Even among those that do wish to have same-sex 
marriage, there is a division in their motives.225 
At a panel discussion at the Sydney Writer’s Festival in 2013, 
Masha Gessen, a prominent Russian-American lesbian activist and 
author, conflates inevitability with gay nihilism: 
It’s a no-brainer that [homosexuals] should have the right to 
marry, but I also think equally that it’s a no-brainer that the 
institution of marriage should not exist. . . . Fighting for gay 
marriage generally involves lying about what we are going to do 
with marriage when we get there—because we lie that the 
institution of marriage is not going to change, and that is a lie. 
The institution of marriage is going to change, and it should 
change. And again, I don’t think it should exist. And I don’t like 
taking part in creating fictions about my life. That’s sort of not 
what I had in mind when I came out thirty years ago. 
I have three kids who have five parents, more or less, and I don’t 
see why they shouldn’t have five parents legally . . . I met my new 
partner, and she had just had a baby, and that baby’s biological 
father is my brother, and my daughter’s biological father is a man 
who lives in Russia, and my adopted son also considers him his 
father. So the five parents break down into two groups of three . . . 
and really, I would like to live in a legal system that is capable of 
reflecting that reality, and I don’t think that’s compatible with the 
institution of marriage.226 
The division exists among lesbian feminists as to whether 
marriage is indeed a proper goal as opposed to the destruction of 
marriage itself. Some of the second-wave feminist writers such as 
 
 224.  Natalie Neusch, Gays Who Don’t Want Gay Marriage, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 26, 
2011, 3:51 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/02/26/gays-who-dont-
want-gay-marriage.html. 
 225.  Lenow, supra note 223. 
 226. Life Matters, Why Get Married When You Could be Happy?, RN (June 11, 2012), 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lifematters/why-get-married/4058506. As 
to current moves to have polyamory recognized as a legal basis for marriage in New Zealand, 
see Auckland Ratepayers Paying to Push Polyamory, FAMILY FIRST NEW ZEALAND (June 5, 
2014), www.familyfirst.org.nz/2014/06/auckland-ratepayers-paying-to-push-polyamory. 
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Betty Friedan, author of the Feminine Mystique in 1963, supported a 
nihilist view: marriage should be destroyed as an institution.227 
Feminists like de Beauvoir and Friedan regarded marriage as an 
oppressive regime.228 In Friedan’s view marriage was “a male 
(patriarchal) artifice designed by men to force women to serve them 
and to have sex with them.”229 
Feminist opposition to the institution of marriage per se has been 
adopted as part of the argument against same-sex marriage. As an 
example, Polikoff has attacked lesbian promotion of same-sex 
marriage because, according to her, feminists “believed [marriage] to 
be an oppressive, patriarchal institution.”230 
According to three United States scholars, who have researched 
and written extensively on legal and policy questions relating to 
marriage generally and same-sex marriage specifically, there are two 
views of marriage:  
The conjugal view of marriage has long informed the law—along 
with the literature, art, philosophy, religion and social practice—of 
our civilization. . . . It is a vision of marriage as a bodily as well as 
an emotional and spiritual bond, distinguished thus by its 
comprehensiveness, which is, like all love, effusive: flowing out into 
the wide sharing of family life and ahead to lifelong fidelity. In 
marriage, so understood, the world rests its hope and finds 
ultimate renewal. 
A second, revisionist view has informed the marriage policy reforms 
of the last several decades. It is a vision of marriage as, in essence, a 
loving emotional bond, one distinguished by its intensity—a bond 
that needn’t point beyond the partners, in which fidelity is 
ultimately subject to one’s own desires. In marriage, so 
understood, partners seek emotional fulfillment, and remain as 
long as they find it.231 
 
 227.  See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). 
 228.  Id. 
 229. AUGUSTO ZIMMERMAN, WESTERN LEGAL THEORY: HISTORY, CONCEPTS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 235 (2012). 
 230. Id. at 239 (quoting Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why 
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in 
Every Marriage”, 72 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993)). 
 231. GIRGIS ET AL., supra note 218, at 1–2. 
ROCHOW.FINROCHOW.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2016  4:13 PM 
609  An Incurable Malaise 
 663 
As already shown, the evidence gathered from other jurisdictions 
shows that there is no longer a need to speculate in respect to the 
effect upon children, the divorce rate, and the impact upon existing 
marriages.232 On the question of the impact upon children, there is 
enough evidence in the studies referred to above to demonstrate that 
conjugal marriage is to be preferred, indeed, even privileged as a 
policy option.233 A stable marriage between biological parents is, on 
the preponderance of the evidence, the best environment in which to 
raise children. Any new institution of marriage should, for these 
purposes, be considered experimental at best and, in reality, second-
rate and potentially disastrous. This desire to change or destroy 
marriage has led the LGBT community to various tactics including 
appropriation of certain words. 
B. Appropriation of Language, Ad Hominem Attacks, 
and Malapropisms 
What has also been evident for some time is that the LGBT 
movement has a tendency to appropriate ordinary words to its cause 
and to create new terms of opprobrium for those who oppose its 
objectives. In the early days of the movement, the noun and verb 
“camp” was appropriated by the movement as a self-reference and an 
acronym of the description of the movement as the “Campaign 
against Moral Persecution.”234 In more recent times the word “gay” 
has been rendered so that it can no longer sensibly be used in any 
other context than to describe a male homosexual. 
And as for the insults invented by the movement, which seem to 
have passed unchecked by linguists into common usage, it is hard to 
imagine a more ill-suited set of words than “homophobia,” 
“homophobe,” and “homophobic.” These malapropisms are either 
ridiculous or are dishonestly devised to divert the argument from 
logic and evidence to personal attack. Instead of describing a fear or 
its sufferer, these concocted words can only refer, legitimately, to the 
fact of disagreement. They are weasel words calculated to demean 
 
 232. See supra Part IV. 
 233.  See supra Part IV. 
 234.  Campaign against Moral Persecution: 30th Anniversary of Decriminalization of 
Homosexuality in NSW, ALASTAIRLAWRIE BLOG (June 7, 2014), 
http://alastairlawrie.net/tag/campaign-against-moral-persecution/.  
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rather than address the argument and the evidence. They are used as 
insulting epithets for all those who oppose, reasonably or otherwise, 
the objectives of the movement. Disagreement with any of the 
LGBT causes célèbres will evoke their use. 
C. Changes to the Current Institution of Marriage in the Event of 
Same-Sex Marriage Becoming Legal 
Next, the proponents of same-sex marriage claim that its 
introduction will have no impact upon the institution of marriage. 
The Court in Baskin accepted this claim, but experience appears to 
put it to the lie in regards to the core definitions and terms of 
marriage. At the very least, there is need to re-define and re-word 
terms that have commonly been associated with heterosexual 
marriage: mother; father; parent; husband; wife; spouse. 
The court must have been aware that as of January 1, 2015 the 
law in California was to change pursuant to the provisions of Senate 
Bill 1306, which redefines marriage in that state as a “personal 
relation arising out of a civil contract between 2 persons . . . .”235 In 
that state, as of January 2015 there is no longer a “husband” or a 
“wife” but only “spouses.”236 This initiative of the current Governor 
of California is a far cry from the initiative in 2008, when fifty-two 
percent of California’s citizens voted to protect marriage and its 
definition as being between one man and one woman.237 
This reform has been hailed by gay rights activists. For example, 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights Executive Director Kate 
Kendell says of the reform: 
Although there is no question that same-sex couples can marry in 
California, the discriminatory language that remains on the 
statutory books creates confusion about the rights of same-sex 
couples. This law makes it clear to everyone that same-sex couples 
can marry and that all spouses have the exact same rights and 
responsibilities under the law, regardless of gender.238  
 
 235.  S.B. 1306, 2013–14 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  See Dennis Romero, You May Now Kiss the “Spouse” Under a New Californian Law, 
LA WEEKLY (July 8, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/informer/2014/07/08/you-may-
now-kiss-the-spouse-under-a-new-california-law. 
 238.  See Id. 
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 The pro-traditional marriage group National Organization for 
Marriage has had a different response. It says that the new law was 
“further proof that redefining marriage is not simply about 
‘equality’. . . it is about fundamentally altering the meaning of the 
institution itself.”239 
In the United Kingdom a similar move was implemented by the 
Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 where Parliament approved 
proposals to remove the terms “husband,” “wife,” and “widow” 
from legislation dating back hundreds of years.240 Parliament voted in 
favor of proposals to prevent a man who marries a King of Britain 
from being referred to as a “Queen” and to stop the same-sex 
partner of a future Prince of Wales from being referred to as the 
“Princess of Wales.”241 Among the amendments that were passed was 
one to the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869, which allowed 
cab licenses of deceased “husbands” to be transferred to their 
“widows” by way of a London Cab Order. The statutory language in 
the Act was changed to ensure no vestigial offence might be caused 
to LGBT cab owners.242 Somehow, though, its wording had survived 
the feminist movement and the offence that the gender specific 
terms might cause to female cabbies. Christian Concern, an 
organization with similar objectives in marriage preservation to those 
of the United States National Organization for Marriage, reacted 
through its spokeswoman, Andrea Williams, predictably as follows: 
This is the land of make-believe and we are operating in the realms 
of the absurd. 
Proposed amendments in areas ranging from cab licences [sic] to 
royal titles show what a mess the Government has created. We are 
twisting language to fit a collective deception that undermines the 
truth about what marriage is.243 
 
 239.  Terms “Husband” and “Wife” Removed from California’s Marriage Law, 
CHRISTIAN CONCERN (July 15, 2014), http://www.christianconcern.com/our-
concerns/same-sex-marriage/ terms-husband-and-wife-removed-from-californias-
marriage-law. 
 240.  The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (Consequential and Contrary 
Provisions and Scotland), c. 30 (Eng. & Wales) [hereinafter The Marriage Act of 2013]. 
 241.  Id. art. 3, sch. 2, pt. 1, para 1. 
 242.  Id. art. 2, sch. 1 para. 1(a)(i). 
 243.  CHRISTIAN CONCERN, supra note 239. 
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D. Of “Butchers, Bakers and Candlestick Makers”: Loss of 
Freedoms of Conscience, Political Expression and Religion  
Another more insidious effect is that there are, consequent upon 
legalization of same-sex marriage and the promotion of LGBT social 
claims, negative impacts upon freedoms of speech, association, 
conscience and religion. The freedom to express views and to act 
upon them is being curtailed in jurisdictions where same-sex 
marriage has either become part of the law or where there are strong 
movements for it to become such.244 It now seems that strongly held 
views in favor of conjugal marriage are not only being discouraged 
by law and policy but, in a number of cases, “offenders” are being 
prosecuted for their positions at the public expense.245 
The resignation of Mozilla Firefox co-founder, Brendan Eich, as 
the CEO of that company drew attention to how much scrutiny 
society gives to people’s political activities in the never-ending search 
for political correctness.246 It has now become offensive in many 
western cultures for a person to hold a different point of view than 
that agitated by the LGBT lobby.247 A specter of political correctness 
was evident recently when Chase Bank administered a questionnaire 
to their employees in which they were asked to disclose whether they 
had disabilities, had a child with disabilities, had a spouse or 
domestic partner with disabilities, were lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgender in their self-description, or were allies of the LGBT 
movement.248 The agenda was less than subtle.249 
 
 244.  Kevin Jones, LGBT Grant-Maker Wants to Win Religious Liberty Fight Within Three 
Years, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (July 29, 2015, 12:31 AM), www.catholicnewsagency.com/ 
news/lgbt-grant-maker-wants-to-win-religious-liberty-fight-within-three-years-96064/. 
 245.  Vincent Funaro, Christian Court Clerk Fired for Refusing to Process Paperwork for 
Gay Marriages Sues Indiana County for Religious Discrimination, THE CHRISTIAN POST (July 
27, 2015), www.christianpost.com/news/christian-court-clerk-fired-for-refusing-to-process-
paper work-for-gay-marriages-sues-indiana-county-for-religious-discrimination-141860; see also 
Matthew Chandler, Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible Avenues for Accommodation 
of Civil Servants Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1625. 
 246.  David Crary,  Rachel Zoll & Michael Liedtke, Mozilla CEO Resignation Raises 
Free-Speech Issues, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2014), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2014/04/04/mozilla-ceo-resignation-free-speech/7328759/. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Brian S. Brown, Boycott Chase Bank, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE BLOG (July 16, 
2014), http://www.nomblog.com/39511/. 
 249.  Id. 
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Despite the fact that in the LGBT and feminist literature there 
are differing reasons as to why one might oppose same-sex marriage, 
it appears that it is those who oppose it upon conscientious or 
religious reasons who have been particularly targeted. The following 
cases are some examples. 
In Craig and Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop Inc. & Anor,250 
the State of Colorado Administrative Court found that a cake-maker, 
who, on grounds of a religious conscientious objection to same-sex 
marriage, declined to bake a cake celebrating such a wedding, was 
held to have acted unlawfully. 
On May 30, 2014, on appeal, the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission upheld the decision of the Administrative Court and 
ordered, among other things, that the cake-maker cease 
discriminating, cause staff to have comprehensive training in anti-
discrimination legislation and report to the commission quarterly for 
two years as to compliance, which reports were to document the 
number of patrons refused service and the reasons for such refusal.251 
What is of interest in this case is that at the time of refusal same-sex 
marriage was not legal in Colorado. The marriage to be celebrated 
had been contracted in another state where same-sex marriage was 
legal.252 It is not clear what the result might have been had the cake-
maker been a strident feminist who objected to any form of marriage 
but particularly was interested in making political statements against 
same-sex marriage and refused on those grounds. That case is now 
under further appeal. 
In Washington State, a florist who felt unable to supply flowers 
for a same-sex couple’s wedding because of her strongly held 
religious convictions, is currently the subject of a lawsuit.253 
In the State of New Mexico, wedding photographers, whose 
religious beliefs prevented them from photographing a same-sex 
 
 250. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop, CR2013-008 (Colo. Admin. Ct. Dec. 6, 2013). 
 251. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop, CR2013-008 (Colo. Civ. Rights Comm. May 
30, 2014). 
 252.  Id. 
 253. Elaine Porterfield, Washington State Florist Sued Again for Refusal to Service Gay 
Wedding, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/us-usa-
gaymarriage-washington-id USBRE93I08820130419. 
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wedding, have been found by the New Mexico Supreme Court to be 
in breach of the New Mexico Human Rights Act.254 
A case that has not yet resulted in a prosecution, but has gained 
notoriety, concerns the demands of a gay rights activist who ordered 
a cake from a Christian-run bakery in Northern Ireland that carried a 
picture of the Sesame Street characters Bert and Ernie with the 
slogan “support gay marriage.”255 The proprietors “insisted that 
producing the cake with the slogan and a picture of the puppets arm 
in arm printed onto the icing would amount to endorsing the 
campaign for the introduction of gay marriage in the province,” 
where it is currently illegal, “and go against their religious 
convictions.”256 The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland has 
now written to the bakers, insisting that they are in breach of the 
law. It claims that refusing to decorate the cake amounted to 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation against the man who 
placed the order.257 
The last-mentioned case underlines the absurdity that has arisen 
from these restrictions upon what can be said or done about 
marriage. Apart from the fact that same-sex marriage is currently 
illegal in Northern Ireland, the order for the cake carried a 
requirement for the bakers to assist in making a political statement 
with which they, as a matter of conscience, 
fundamentally disagreed.258 
Further, there seems no basis for appropriating Bert and Ernie as 
symbols of same-sex marriage. Bert and Ernie are puppets. They 
have no sexual feelings, inclinations to marriage, or desire to make 
political statements on the subject. This was made clear by Sesame 
Street Muppets™ on its Facebook page in 2011, but seems to have 
gone unnoticed in the pursuit of the bakery: 
 
 254. Elaine Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 255. Bert and Ernie ‘Gay Wedding Cake’: Christian-Run Bakery Faces Legal Action over 
Refusal to Supply Cake, INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/northern-ireland-bakery-refuses-to-
make-gay-bert-and-ernie-wedding-cake-9590745.html. 
256. Id. 
 257. Id. The above are merely some examples of many. For discussion of recent events in 
Canada, see Lain T. Benson, Law Deans, Legal Coercion and the Freedoms of Association and 
Religion in Canada, 71 ADVOCATE 671 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328945. 
 258. INDEPENDENT, supra note 255.  
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Bert and Ernie are best friends. They were created to teach 
preschoolers that people can be good friends with those who are 
very different from themselves. 
Even though they are identified as male characters and possess 
many human traits and characteristics (as most Sesame 
Street Muppets™ do), they remain puppets, and do not have a 
sexual orientation.259 
Finally, there is nothing in the news to date that indicates that 
the person who ordered the cake had any license from Sesame Street 
to reproduce Bert and Ernie’s images on a cake to make a political 
statement. Without such a license, the cake makers would infringe 
upon those rights and render themselves amenable to action for such 
infringement. And, with such a weak case, the bakery is being 
pursued at the State’s expense. 
In making these observations regarding the United States and 
other jurisdictions, certainly Australia is not immune from this form 
of state-sponsored persecution of those who are not politically 
correct about LGBTs. Just what the position would be if same-sex 
marriage were to become legal, one can only speculate. But how it 
might be for ordinary business operators was clearly illustrated in the 
recent Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal decision in 
Christian Youth Camps Limited & Rowe v. Cobaw Community 
Health Services Limited & Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human 
Rights Commission & The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria, 
discussed by Associate Professor Foster in his case note concerning 
the decision.260 
In Christian Youth Camps, the majority decided the camp was 
liable for discriminatory conduct because it did not allow a gay youth 
group to book one of the camps.261 This result has been criticized in 
the press262 as well as by my colleague, Associate Professor Foster.263 
 
 259. Sesame Workshop Statement on Bert and Ernie Petitions, SESAME WORKSHOP (Aug. 
11, 2011 10:00 AM), available at https://www.facebook.com/note.php?created&&note_id= 
10150290119497855&id=1375 9741267. 
 260. See Neil Foster, Christian Youth Camp Liable for Declining Booking From 
Homosexual Support Group, FREEDOM 4 FAITH, http://www.freedom4faith.org.au/resources 
/Reading/Christian%20Youth%20Camp_Neil%20Foster%20Summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 
27, 2015). 
 261.  Christian Youth Camps Limited & Rowe v. Cobaw Community Health Services 
Ltd., [2014] VSCA 75 (Austl.). 
 262. Foster & Towers, supra note 2. 
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The misreading of authority and international law that is the subject 
of criticism will soon be the subject of argument in the High Court, 
as an application for special leave is pending. The majority based its 
reasons upon a number of platforms.  
Among them is one that is captured in the following dictum: 
The appeal submission for Cobaw was that the purported 
distinction—between sexual orientation of those attending the 
camp and what would be said to them about their sexual 
orientation—was misconceived. Reliance was placed on the 
following statement in her Honour’s reasons: 
“Sexual orientation, like gender, race and ethnicity, [is] part of 
a person’s being, or identity. The essence of the prohibitions 
on discrimination on the basis of attributes such as sexual 
orientation, gender, race or ethnicity is to recognise the right 
of people to be who and what they are. . . . To distinguish 
between an aspect of a person’s identity, and conduct which 
accepts that aspect of identity, or encourages people to see that 
part of identity as normal, or part of the natural and healthy 
range of human identities, is to deny the right to enjoyment 
and acceptance of identity.” 
As the amicus submission of the ICJ pointed out, the proposition 
that sexual orientation is an important aspect of a person’s identity 
has been affirmed in other jurisdictions. 264  
The dictum cited from the Court of first instance was accepted as 
being open on the evidence by the majority. 
In contrast, Redlich JA, in the minority, adopted an approach 
that seems more acceptable, in terms of logic and a reality that 
tolerates a diversity of opinions to be expressed in the public square. 
It is one that I respectfully suggest would have commended itself to 
the Court in Baskin.  
His Honour observed as follows: 
 
 263. Neil Foster, Christian Youth Camp Liable for Declining Booking from Homosexual 
Youth Group, available at http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/78 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2015); ACL Team, Associate Professor Neil Foster Talks About the Christian Youth Camps Case, 
AUSTL. CHRISTIAN LOBBY (May 27, 2014, 4:14 AM), http://www.acl.org.au/2014/ 
05/associate-professor-neil-foster-talks-about-the-christian-youth-camps-case/. 
 264.  Christian Youth Camps v. Cobaw (2014) VSCA 75, ¶ 57 (citations omitted). 
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The precepts and standards which a religious adherent accepts as 
binding in order to give effect to his or her beliefs are as much part 
of their religion as the belief itself. The obligation of a person to 
give effect to religious principles in everyday life is derived from the 
overarching personal responsibility to act in obedience to the 
Divine’s will as it is reflected in those principles. Religious faith is a 
fundamental right because our society tolerates pluralism and 
diversity and because of the value of religion to a person whose 
faith is a central tenet of their identity. The person must, within the 
limits prescribed by the exemptions, be free to give effect to 
that faith.265 
Having described a person’s religious belief to be a central part 
of their identity, it follows that all persons of any persuasion, be it 
moral, political or religious, must be free to express those views 
within the marketplace within certain reasonable but not stifling 
limits. Certainly, no person should be required to act contrary to 
their conscience. Redlich JA provides an illustration: 
For example, assume that the applicants had been informed that 
the purpose of the proposed forum was to gather together for the 
purpose of discussing the contentions that the Divine does not 
exist and that Christ does not say, and of how the community 
might be made aware of those views. Once the applicants became 
appraised of that purpose, I do not doubt that it would have been 
necessary for them to refuse the use of their facility for such 
purposes. That their beliefs necessitated such a course flows from 
the findings made by the Tribunal under [section] 75(2) as to the 
content of the Christian Brethren’s beliefs and principles. The same 
must hold true for other religious beliefs or principles which the 
adherence of their faith genuinely believe reflected the wills of the 
Divine and commanded obedience.266 
The above illustrations demonstrate what would be lost, based 
on experiences in other jurisdictions as well as in Australia, if such a 
reform were to become law. The cost is, on the face of it, just too 
great to existing liberties of conscience and religion. Yet, again, these 
considerations were absent in Baskin. 
 
 265.  Id. ¶ 560. 
 266.  Id. ¶ 571. 
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E. Inevitability? 
Finally, the opening paragraph of Baskin accepts without 
question the argument that same-sex marriage is inevitable.267 This is 
the argument that seems to have currency as a sort of defeatist 
justification when no other logical or evidence-based argument 
will suffice. 
Certainly, any sense of inevitability does not hold true in 
Australia. Only one jurisdiction, the ACT, has ever passed same-sex 
marriage legislation into law, despite numerous attempts in the 
federal Parliament and various states, and that case, as we have seen, 
was struck down by the High Court.268  
Recently, the European Court of Human Rights handed down 
its decision in Hämäläinen v. Finland, in which petitioners sought a 
declaration that the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) Articles 8 and 12 gave a right for citizens to require of 
members states legislation that permitted same-sex marriage.269 The 
court made it clear that there was no right to same-sex marriage 
under either Article 8 or 12 of the ECHR: 
71. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which Article 8 
of the Convention cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation 
on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage. 
. . . . 
96. The Court reiterates that Article 12 of the Convention is a lex 
specialis for the right to marry. It secures the fundamental right of a 
man and woman to marry and to found a family. Article 12 
expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law. It 
enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being between a 
man and a woman. While it is true that some Contracting States 
have extended marriage to same-sex partners, Article 12 cannot be 
 
 267.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 268.  See supra text accompanying notes 22–56. 
 269.  Hämäläinen v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 259, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%2237359/09%2
2],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22ite
mid%22:[%22001-145768%22]}. 
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construed as imposing an obligation on the Contracting States to 
grant access to marriage to same-sex couples.270 
The Court also dismissed an alleged “European standards and 
consensus” that would prevent states from defining marriage as the 
union between one man and one woman: 
73. From the information available to the Court . . .  it appears that 
currently ten member States allow same-sex marriage [: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (England and 
Wales only)]). . . . 
74. Thus, it cannot be said that there exists any European 
consensus on allowing same-sex marriages.271 
It seems far better to judge matters as they actually are. In 
Europe, there is a diversity of positions in relation to same-sex 
marriage.272 Some permit same-sex partnership registration.273 
Among the most recent to introduce same-sex marriage are England 
and Wales.274 Of all European nations, including the twenty-eight 
EU countries, only eleven permit same-sex marriages,275 while others 
permit some form of union with limited legal recognition.276 Ten of 
the thirteen most recent member states to join the EU have rejected 
the proposal for same-sex marriage.277 Australia may be considered 
the last redoubt among Anglophone nations, but it is by no means 
alone in the West or indeed in the world.278 
 
 270.  Id. §§ 71, 96 (citing Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 2010 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. § 101; Rees v. The United Kingdom, Ser. A no. 106, Oct. 171986, §§ 43-44). 
 271.  Id. §§ 73–74. 
 272.  Michael Lipka, Eastern and Western Europe Divided Over Gay Marriage, 
Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (December 12, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/12/eastern-and-western-europe-divided-
over-gay-marriage-homosexuality/. 
 273.  Gay Marriage Around the World, BBC NEWS WORLD (April 23, 2013), 
http://www.bbc. com/news/world-21321731. 
 274.  The Marriage Act of 2013, c. 30 (Eng. & Wales). 
 275.  Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark, 
France, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom (England and Wales). 
 276.  BBC NEWS WORLD, supra note 273. 
 277.  Michael W. Chapman, 10 of 13 Newest EU States Reject ‘Gay Marriage’, 
CNSNEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:38 PM),  http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/michael-
w-chapman/10-13-newest-eu-states-reject-gay-marriage. 
 278.  BBC News World, supra note 273. See postscript regarding Ireland. 
ROCHOW.FINROCHOW.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2016  4:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
674 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In July of 2014, a Sydney judge compared society’s opprobrium 
for pedophilia and incest to the position it took on homosexual 
relations only a few decades ago.279 He advocated that incest should 
no longer be a criminal offence given that the progeny of 
consanguineous sexual relations can be prevented either through 
contraception or abortion.280 More recently, a German government 
ethics committee came to the conclusion that not only is there 
nothing morally wrong with sexual relations between siblings; those 
relations are a right.281 While these liberal agitations were taking 
place, immigration officers in Sydney detained a fourteen-year-old 
girl because they suspected that she was travelling to Lebanon for an 
arranged marriage with a much older man.282 And Elton John 
recently assured us that Jesus would have approved of same-sex 
marriage.283 Added to these, we have the two cases that are the 
subject of this paper. 
Critic Rosemary Neill commented recently that the fascination 
with dystopias found in the baby-boomer generation is continuing 
into the next generation of book and film consumers.284 None of the 
incidents referred to in the preceding paragraph would seem out of 
place in any novel or film in the genre. Yet, just a generation ago, 
none of these headline incidents would have been thought possible; 
they would only have appeared in fiction. 
Whether it be in 1984,285 Animal Farm,286 Brave New World,287 
The Handmaid’s Tale,288 Never Let Me Go,289 or Fahrenheit 451,290 the 
 
 279.  Hall, supra note 59. 
 280.  Hall, supra note 59. 
 281.  Huggler, supra note 59. 
 282.  Brennan, supra note 59. 
 283.  Dermot Murnaghan, Sir Elton Says Jesus Would Back Gay Marriage, SKY NEWS 
(June 29, 2014), http://news.sky.com/story/1291479/sir-elton-says-jesus-would-back-
gay-marriage. 
 284.  Rosemary Neill, Teen Dystopias Like the Hunger Games and the Giver Take Over 
Hollywood, THE AUSTL. (Sep. 13, 2014), available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au 
/arts/review/teen-dystopias-like-the-hunger-games-and-the-giver-take-over-hollywood/story-
fn9n8gph-1227055348774. 
 285.  GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950). 
 286.  GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1945). 
 287.  ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). 
 288.  MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1986). 
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themes seem recurrent: an enslaving, all-pervading, totalitarian 
regime having sprung from some unidentified historical source of 
dissatisfaction, some distant past apocalypse, technology having gone 
mad, or from inaction in enforcing moral codes; loss of the value of 
the individual; re-definition or abolition of the family; ruthless 
suppression of any opposition. There are many variations of these 
themes and they seem to hold our fascination and that of the rising 
generation with young adult novels and films churning out similar 
subliminal warnings. But there is, with only a few exceptions, one 
yawning gap in all of the dystopias depicted: there is complete silence 
about God, conscience, and religion. 
We live in a world where there are two currents pulling in 
different directions. There are the fundamentalist extremists who see 
the ideal society as theocratic: one in which everyone is subservient 
to God as they imagine Him.291 Then there is the other direction, in 
which we are pulled by the West, by secular extremists, in the name 
of “equality,” where there is freedom from religion rather than 
freedom of religion, where God is completely banished from the 
public square, and where freedom of religion and conscience end at 
the temple door.292 These two directions are antithetical. One 
compels absorption in a conception of God to the exclusion of all 
care for our fellow humans; the other is absorbed with the rights of 
humans to the exclusion of God. 
As critical as I am of both of the reasoning of the High Court in 
ACT and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Baskin, the 
question must be asked at a metaphysical level whether they are 
merely social barometers: symptomatic of a deeper malaise in public 
intellectual activity in the academy, the press, the legislature, 
executive arms of government, and, now, in the courts. There is a 
consciousness of this malaise in the writing of Habermas, in which he 
proposes some adaptation of Judeo-Christian ethics re-written in 
 
 289.  KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME GO (2006). 
 290.  RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953). 
 291.  Kevin Craig, Theocracy!, CRAIG FOR CONG., http://kevincraig.us/theocracy.htm 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 292.  About FFRF, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., http://ffrf.org/about (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
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secular code.293 But the cure for this malaise has been the subject of 
vain searches by post-modern ethicists and philosophers. Western 
public thought seems set upon a path of banishing, in so far as it is 
possible, all religion and mention of God from the public square. If 
Nietzsche was premature in declaring God dead,294 there are now 
many who seem intent upon burying Him—dead or alive. 
It seems that all public institutions are intent, to one degree or 
another, upon testing the Dostoyeskian notion that if God does not 
exist, then everything is permissible. As secularism takes firmer hold 
of the public psyche, we are confronted with a public Nietzschean 
amorality, evident in the reasons of Judge Posner in Baskin.295 Some 
alternative form of theocratic fundamentalist dictatorship needs only 
to be mentioned to be rejected. If we are to have a dystopian reality 
in the West, it seems it will be one of our own making. 
But, the Nietzschean outcome seems most likely unless the West 
was to embrace afresh the Lockean model of a conscience and 
equality before the law, informed by Christian belief, as advocated by 
Jeremy Waldron.296 While the return to Lockean ideals remains an 
unlikely possibility, the most likely result will be more of the fudging 
on legal principles evident in ACT. And as poor as the unrestrained 
rant passing as judicial reasoning from Judge Posner in Baskin may 
be, one can expect more of this form of economic rationalism rather 
than a serious and even-handed grappling with these issues. 
If there is no balance possible between the divine and the 
profane, is the West so committed to secularism that it can see no 
other way? It would seem from the incidents referred to, the legalism 
of the High Court and the economic rationalism of the Seventh 
Circuit, that there may be more than coincidence. We may, in fact, as 
 
 293.  Jürgen Habermas, Modernity: An Unfinished Project, in HABERMAS AND THE 
UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 38, 38–55 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves & Seyla Benhabib eds., 
1997); JÜRGEN HABERMAS THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 
3–49 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998). 
 294.  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE (THE JOYFUL WISDOM) 120 (Bernard 
Williams ed., Josefine Nauckoff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1882). 
 295.  KENAN MALIK, THE QUEST FOR A MORAL COMPASS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF 
ETHICS, at v–vi (2014). 
 296.  JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN 
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 82 (2002). 
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Western society, be suffering symptoms of an incurable 
dystopian malaise. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
Since the writing of this article, the Supreme Court of United 
States has handed down its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.297 There 
were many surprising elements to be found in the reasoning of the 
majority, not the least that two judges who had previously shown a 
disposition to favor same-sex marriage before hearing the case chose 
not to recuse themselves.298 Had they done so, it seems the result 
would have been entirely the opposite.  
While these are matters for the comment of others, there is one 
other surprising element that contrasts with the Australian 
experience. The decision of the Supreme Court seems to display a 
relaxed, if not cavalier, attitude to vaulting the divide between the 
legislative arm of government and the judicial arm under the 
separation of powers doctrine.  
Unlike the Australian High Court, which handed the question of 
same-sex marriage back to the federal Parliament, the majority in the 
Supreme Court refused, by process of a number of constitutional 
interpretations, to acknowledge the democratic decisions reached by 
electors in a number of states and arrogated the decision to themselves 
as a majority of five to four, with two of the Justices having refused, as 
noted before in this postscript, to recuse themselves.299   
But, the decision of the Supreme Court could be interpreted as 
one more fall of the dominoes in the direction of same sex-marriage 
 
 297.  135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015). 
 298.  Justices Ginsburg and Kagan had shown what would seem to have been partiality 
prior to the hearing. Both Justices had reportedly performed same-sex marriages. Michael 
Gryboski, Should Two Supreme Court Justices Who Officiated Gay Weddings Recuse Themselves 
from Same-Sex Marriage Case?, CP POL. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.christianpost.com/ 
news/should-two-supreme-court-justices-who-officiated-gay-weddings-recuse-themselves-
from-same-sex-marriage-case-135049/; Liz Goodwin, As Arguments Near, Justice Ginsburg 
Has Already Made Up Her Mind on Gay Marriage, YAHOO! POL. (Apr. 27, 2015), 
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/as-arguments-near-justice-ginsburg-has-
already117280631046.html. It therefore would seem that position of both Justices arguably 
fell under the mandatory recusal provision in title 28, part I, chapter 21, section 455 of the 
U.S. Code: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 
 299.  See 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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in Australia. In fact, there have been three other events that have 
occurred since this article was first written that may be regarded as 
watershed moments for those that support the introduction of same-
sex marriage. First came the Irish referendum where the result was in 
favor of same-sex marriage.300Next came the change of Australian 
Prime Minister from one who was firmly opposed to same-sex 
marriage to one who strongly supports it.301And then, finally, a 
Senate select committee report was handed down recommending 
that there be a parliamentary vote rather than a popular vote on 
the question.302 
And yet while the same-sex marriage debate has, of course, 
continued to rage in Australia, the position does not seem to have 
changed. And it now seems that the contrast could not be starker 
between the American and the Australian experiences. What is still 
proposed by the current federal government is that there be either a 
constitutional referendum or a national plebiscite on the issue of 
same-sex marriage.303 By this mechanism, the government seeks, it 
says, to hand the question of a radical change to the age old social 
institution of marriage back to the people.  
So, by a democratic political process rather than a legal one, 
Australia seems destined, under the current government, to test 
whether there is any cure for what seems in some Western nations to 
be as one of its symptoms of the malaise: the dictation by a small 
elite as to what is acceptable for the majority. 
 
 300. Results Received at the Central Count Centre for the Referendum on the Thirty-
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Bill 2015, REFERENDUM IR., 
http://referendum.ie/results.php?ref=10 (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 301. George Williams, Under PM Turnbull, Where to Now for Same-Sex Marriage?, THE 
AGE (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.theage.com.au/comment/under-pm-turnbull-where-to-
now-for-samesex-marriage-20150919-gjqmiu.html. 
302. Matter of a Popular Vote, in the Form of a Plebiscite or Referendum, on the Matter of 
Marriage in Australia, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Marriage_ 
Plebiscite/Report. 
 303. Coalition Nails Colours to Traditional Marriage, THE AUSTL. (August 12, 2015), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/coalition-nails-colours-to-traditional-
marriage/story-fn59niix-1227479570397.  
